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ABSTRACT
Urbanization in Kenya is taking place at a tremendous pace. The population of Nairobi, Kenya's largest
urban center, is expected to double between 1980 and 2000, and the city faces many of the typical
problems experienced by other Third World metropolises. In terms of shelter alone, between thirty and
forty percent of the city's inhabitants live in uncontrolled settlements, most of which lack essential
services. This thesis is based upon the proposition that alternative ways and means for dealing with
problems of this nature and magnitude in resource-constrained situations must be found. The concept of
site-and-services is viewed as a viable alternative in this respect, and is studied as an example of
planned change.
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part Che presents an account of the planning and implementation
of site-and-services schemes in Nairobi over a period of two decades. by tracing the introduction and
application of a relatively new approach to low-cost urban shelter provision, a concrete illustration is
provided of the types of problems and conflicts likely to arise in similar efforts to realize planned
change.
Part 'iWo focuses on two aspects related to the process and nature of change. Alternative strateg ies for
achieving or influencing change are discussed with reference to particular incidents in the Nairobi
experience. An examination of positive attributes of change follows, and the extent to which the site-
and-services concept (in theory, and as applied in Nairobi over time) lends itself to the phenomenon of
planned change is explored. Some observations on the scope and prospects for planned change are
offered.
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THE URBAN PIOBLEM IN THE THIRD W)RLD
Over the last half century or so, most Third
World cities have become arenas of rapid,
continuous, and sometimes turbulent, change.
Almost all current indicators appear to suggest
that this state of affairs will prevail well
into the foreseeable future. Most cities have
experienced massive population growth due to a
combination of high levels of migration from
rural to urban areas, high birth rates and lower
death rates. In 1950 approximately twenty
percent of the total population in developing
countries lived in urban areas. By 1975, this
proportion had risen to an estimated thirty-one
percent.1 Between 1950 and 1975 the urban areas
of developing countries absorbed some 400
million people; between 1975 and 2000, the
increase is projected to be close to one billion
people.2 Some forty-five percent of the people
in developing countries are expected to be
living in cities and towns by the year 2000. 3
Excessive growth or hyper-urbanization4 is
most severe in large or primate cities.
Dramatic examples of this population explosion
are Mexico City and Sao Paolo which each grew by
over half a million people annually during the
mid-1979's. Around the same time, the number of
inhabitants in Djakarta and Seoul increased by
over a quarter of a million. 5 The number of
very large cities in the developing world is
expanding rapidly. It is expected that the
number of cities with populations of one million
or more will rise from 118 in 1980 to 284 in
2000,6 and that the number of people living in
them will triple. 7 There is greater concern
over cities with five million or more
inhabitants (termed super cities by the United
Nations Fund for Population Activities). In
1950 there were only two super cities in the
developing world - Greater Buenos Aires and
Shanghai - while in 2000 it is expected that
forty-five such cities will exist there.
8
Twelve of the world's fifteen largest cities
will be in developing countries by the turn of
the century. 9 Although there has been a strong
tendency to concentrate economic resources in
the major metropolitan areas, employment
12
opportunities have been unable to keep pace with
demand and have lagged further and further
behind. Meanwhile, it is estimated that an
additional 600 million people will join the
labor force in the Third World between 1980 and
2000.10 Despite the fact that the incidence of
poverty is less in urban than in rural areas,
the absolute numbers of poor living in towns and
cities are large.
According to World Bank estimates (1978),
regional averages for the proportions of urban
population with below poverty level incomes
varied from as low as 18.2 percent for the North
Africa, Middle East, and Southern Europe region
to as high as 50.3 percent for the South Asia
region.11 Some of these people live in
conditions of abject poverty; they are unable to
meet even their most basic needs in terms of
food, clothing and shelter. In most instances,
the public sector has been unable to generate
sufficient revenues and has paid inadequate
attention to cost recovery. City authorities
suffer from serious shortages of skilled
manpower and other essential resources. Most
recently, urban growth and developnent has been
affected by the climate of declining national
economies and frequently unstable political
environments. Under these conditions shelter
provision and public service delivery systems
are inadequate or non-existent. Crude estimates
for the percentage of city populations living in
slums or squatter settlements for sixty-six
selected cities in the Third World provided a
median figure of a staggering forty-three per-
cent. These crude estimates ranged from as low
as 1.5 percent (Beirut) to as high as ninety
percent (Yaounde and Addis Ababa).12 While
urban areas are on average much better serviced
than rural areas, substantial portions of urban
populations in developing countries do not have
access to safe water or excreta disposal. In
most instances, the urban poor also have limited
access to health services and educational oppor-
tunities.
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NEED FOR CHANGE
All of the above circumstances, and more, have
put a tremendous amount of stress and strain on
the institutional and physical apparatus in
Third World cities. There has been a gradual
recognition of the inadequacies and
inappropriateness of conventional wisdom and
traditional schools of thought in the area of
urban planning theory and practice. As a
result, policy-makers, planners and designers
have been forced to re-examine their existing
basis for professional expertise, search for
alternative approaches, and devise new ways and
means for bringing about phenomenological and
structural change.
The kind of change being discussed here is
typified by the urban policies espoused by
organizations such as the World Bank. Over the
last decade, the World Bank has been one of the
major financiers of so-called new-stylel 3
urban projects in the Third World, and an
influential actor in the trafficking of ideas.
The World Bank's activities in the urban sector
include the following:
- Member countries have been actively encouraged
to make policy changes favoring low-cost
approaches in providing shelter and essential
services such as roads and water-supply
systems. Authorities have been advised to tap
private savings from beneficiaries wherever
possible, and invest public funds in more
efficient and equitable ways.
- Assistance has been channelled towards
projects specifically designed to help the
poor, provide land tenure, promote cost
recovery and introduce affordable design
standards and procedures.
- Increasing attention and resources are being
focussed on the development of institutional
capacity by improving project management,
providing facilities for specialized training
of project personnel, streamlining cumbersome
bureaucratic procedures, making administration
more effective through the use of incentive
mechanisms, stiff penalties and enforceable
legal controls, and pressing for greater
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coordination amongst public agencies. Due to
the unconventional nature of many projects,
previous experience and know-how have often
been lacking. To overcome this, the World
Bank has advocated an approach of systematic
learning-by-doing.
In a World Bank staff World Working Paper, Linn
(1979)14 identifies what he considers to be the
major policy issues facing those who are
concerned with the growth of cities in the Third
World. Linn also discusses policies designed to
achieve increased efficiency and equity in urban
developnent, and prescribes thirty-two do's
and don'ts for decision-making in the public
policy arena.1 5
This list covered the following areas:
administration, regulation, taxation, public
investment in urban infrastructure, pricing of
public services, social services, small scale
enterprise, and the land market. The
application of these do's and don'ts would
entail significant institutional change in most
cases, and a shift in approach towards technical
issues.
This thesis and implementation process. The
decision focuses on the issue of positive change
in the planning and to select the theme of
change rose out of a belief that alternative
and innovative approaches which grapple effec-
tively with the problems facing Third World
cities need to be found.
A case study methodology is used in this thesis.
The site-and-services approach to low-cost urban
shelter and community developnent is used as an
example of positive and innovative change. By
documenting and analyzing the dynamics of a
particular experience in a specific context, the
intention is to shed light on how to go about
planning and implementing positive change. The
site-and services approach to low-cost urban
shelter and community developnent is used here
as an example of positive change: on the one
hand it is viewed as the product of a shift
(change) in thinking about shelter provision
under resource-constrained conditions, and on
the other hand, it is seen as a vehicle for
achieving increased socio-economic benefits
(change).
hard-hit by rising energy costs and declining
world-market prices for its agricultural
exports.
OVERVIEW OF CONTENTS
THE CASE
Nairobi, Kenya, from the mid 1950's through the
decade of the 1970's is the context for this
study. The experience with site-and-services
schemes in this city during the period mentioned
is described and analyzed, and some general
lessons are drawn.
A primate city, Nairobi faces many of the
typical problems encountered by large Third
World cities: rapidly increasing population;
mushrooming squatter settlements, mounting
traffic congestion and transportation problems;
overburdened physical infrastructure; rising
unemployment; inadequate social services; a
widening of the visible gap between the rich and
the poor, accompanied by political tension and
social unrest. The Kenyan economy has also been
The thesis consists of two distinct but related
parts. Following this Introduction, Part One
provides background information on the context,
and then proceeds to give a detailed account of
the planning and implementation of site-and-
services schemes in Nairobi over a period
spanning about two and a half decades, from the
mid-1950's to the end of the 1970's. The devel-
opment and application of the site-and-services
concept is carefully traced in three successive
low-cost shelter projects, all involving the
Nairobi City Council (NCC) as the main planning
and implementing authority.
Chapter Two begins by sketching out the nature
and extent of urbanization in Kenya. Ajainst
this back-drop, a more detailed picture of
Nairobi presented. The city's institutional and
15
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physical settings are described, and their pre-
dominant and striking features are drawn out.
This chapter is designed to equip the reader with
some perspective for viewing the chronological
unfolding of events which follow to occupy the
rest of Part One.
Chapter Three dwells on two major developnents
which occurred in the mid-1960's, during the
first few years of Kenya's post-independence
era. These two developnents were: a) a visit
by a United Nations mission to study Kenya's
housing problems; and b) the subsequent for-
mation of a national housing authority. The
former resulted in the first formulation of
comprehensive national housing policy, and set
the stage for Kenya to receive large amounts of
foreign assistance, financial and technical, in
the field of housing/shelter. The latter set up
an institution, the National Housing Corporation
(NHC), with the potential to implement housing
programs nationwide on a large scale. However,
many observers agree that the performance of the
NHC has been dismal. Some of the probable
reasons for this prevailing state of affairs are
explained.
Chapter Four outlines the developnent of two
site-and-services schemes in Nairobi during the
mide- and late-1960's; Kariobangi and Mathare.
These two schemes represent the earliest
attempts in post-independent Kenya to change the
role of public authorities from providing
complete housing units to
... sub-division of urban land and its
servicing with varying combinations
and levels pf public utilities and
community facilities for residential
and commercial use.
16
The Kariobangi scheme consisted of a single
standard sized lot and communal sanitary facili-
ties throughout the whole site. No community
or commercial facilities were included in this
scheme. The Mathare scheme went much further
than the Kariobangi scheme in what it attempted
to accomplish. There were three types of lots,
distinguished primarily by varying levels of
services. The plans for the scheme, which was
17
not fully realized, also included various com-
munity facilities and the location of small
scale commercial and industrial activity. Both
the Kariobangi and Mathare schemes set important
what it attempted to accomplish. There were
three types of lots, distinguished primarily by
varying levels of services. The plans for the
Mathare scheme, which was not fully realized,
also included various community facilities and
the location of small scale commercial and
industrial activity. Both the Kariobangi and
Mathare schemes set important precendents for
the following generation of internationally
sponsored site-and-services projects.
Chapter Five presents a detailed account of the
largest single site-and-services scheme planned
and implemented in Kenya to date; this is the
World Bank sponsored Dandora Community
Deveopnent Project (DCDP) in Nairobi the incep-
tion and planning of this project spanned a four
year period during which progress appears to
have been achieved through a series of
struggles. The account covers the completion of
Phase Cne of the DCDP, and ends at the detailed
planning stage of Phase Two. Key episodes of
this saga have been related with a view to sur-
facing the major issues and competing forces.
Compared to the Kariobangi and Mathare schemes,
the DCDP represents a quantum jump in the devel-
opnent and application of the site-and-services
concept in the specific context of Nairobi.
Overall, the author' s intention in Part One has
been to provide the reader with an instructive
tale of the introduction, and the subsequent
evolution and application of a relatively new
concept in a specific context.
Part Two examines two practical aspects of
planning and implementing change: one, alter-
native strategies for positive intervention in
the planning and implementation process; and
two; the nature of the planned change itself.
No attempt is made to give a full or even par-
tial explanation for the tale told in Part Che
of this thesis. Rather, two typologies are used
to zero in on two important aspects of change
18
pertaining to process and product.
Chapter Six looks at the process and focusses on
the various types of strategies which may be
employed to bring about, or influence, planned
change. A typology of such strategies, borrowed
from the social sciences, is used as an aid for
identifying and analyziang certain deliberations
within the Nairobi site-and-services experience.
These deliberations involve those steps taken to
deliberately bring about, or influence, a state
of change. The typology of strategies consists
of facilitative, re-educative, persuasive and
power strategies. Each type of strategy is
briefly discussed together with the instances of
its use in the Nairobi experience. The pros and
cons of each type of strategy for planned change
are explored. At the beginning of the chapter,
a brief case is made in favor of change -
oriented planning and implementation process.
The last two sections of this chapter are com-
mentaries on the prevailing attitudes anongst
officials concerned with public housing, and the
role of expatriates in the formulation of
housing policies and programs.
Chapter Seven looks at the special attributes,
or characteristic features, of change (as a
product) which are most likely to influence its
introduction, acceptance, adoption, and applica-
tion. Using a set of positive attributes of
change as a yardstick, the site-and-services
concept is measured in terms of its suitability
for change. Accompanying this evaluation of the
site-and-services concept in theory, is a
parallel assessment of the concept in practice
as applied in the case of Nairobi.
The final chapter of this thesis presents con-
cluding remarks about an agenda for planned
change, and some observations about the scope and
prospects for such change efforts in Nairobi.
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URBANIZATION IN KENYA
Kenya has one of the world's highest population
growth rates (3.3%), and its total population is
estimated to double between 1980 and 2000.1
Although over eighty-five percent of Kenya's
population is still rural, urbanization is
proceeding at a tremendous pace.
According to census figures, Kenya's towns
(settlements of 2000 inhabitants or more)
increased in number from seventeen to forty-
eight between 1948 and 1969, and there were
sixty-eight such settlements in 1978. During
the period from 1948 to 1969, the urban popula-
tion grew proporionately from 5.1 percent to 9.9
percent of the total population, and in 1978
this figure rose to 14.3 percent. From 1962 to
1969 Kenya's urban population grew at an average
rate of 7.1 percent per annum, more than double
the annual average rate of growth of the
country's overall population. In recent years
urban growth rates have averaged 7.7 percent a
year.
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Planners project that the number of urban
settlements will rise to 108 by 1983, and that
by the year 2000, a staggering 8.5 million
people will reside in Kenya's cities and towns.
All this puts immense stress and strain on the
country's institutional apparatus and physical
infrastructure. In terms of housing alone,
there was an estimated shortfall of 140,000
units in urban areas in 1979. Approximately
30,000 units per year were needed to handle the
increase in demand between 1979 and 1983.
Government estimates indicate that about sixty
percent of all urban families earn less than the
median urban income in 1979, and of the existing
440,000 urban households, only thirty percent
were expected to have sufficient incomes to
afford minimum cost conventional housing.
Already about thirty-five percent of all urban
house-holds exist in squatter settlements or
slums.
The serious shortages in housing and basic
services in the nation's rapidly growing urban
settlements tell only part of the story. Cn
the basis of aggregate statistics, Kenya's
economic growth has been steady and healthy.
The per capita Gross National Product (GNP) grew
by an annual average of 2.2 percent between 1960
and 1978. By which time it had reached a figure
of US $330. Between 1965 and 1972, Kenya's per
capita GNP grew at a average annual rate of 4.1
percent, one of the highest rates in Black
Africa. But while the country's economy
appeared to be steaming ahead at an impressive
rate, income distribution was lagging seriously
behind. A study of income distribution in
sixty-eight countries, carried out for the Wobrld
Bank and published in 1974, revealed that Kenya
had one of the highest degrees of inequality.2
Cne source approximates that 20.2 percent of
the national income is received by the top five
percent of the population, while the bottom
twenty percent receive 3.9 percent; forty-
three percent of the total population is said
to be living under conditions of so-called
absolute poverty.3 In a comparative analysis of
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Kong, Madras, Mexico City and Nairobi - Nairobi
was found to have the highest proportion of
households unable to afford even the cheapest
unit of conventionally built public housing.
The reduction of inequality, particularly in the
larger urban centers where it is starkly
visible, is one of the most crucial problems
facing Kenya today, a problem which is more than
likely to undermine the country's political
stability.
However, pessimistic pronouncements about the
existence of urban poverty in Kenya should be
treated with caution. Collier and Lal (1980) in
a recent World Bank staff working paper, suggest
that urban poverty in Kenya is limited in
extent and that its incidence has not increased
over the years.6 They estimated that given a
well accepted definition for a household poverty
line in Nairobi (K Shs 2,150 per annum in 1974),
less than three percent of the urban population
was poor in 1974. Only a very loose correlation
was found between unemployment and urban
poverty.
However, the average urban poor household
was found to have 1.44 members in the labor
force as compared with 1.76 for all urban house-
holds and 2.2 for non-poor households. The
implication of this is that the number of
dependents is higher for poor urban house-holds.
It should also be noted that these poor urban
households are much more likely to have some of
their family members still living in the rural
home to whom a significant portion of the urban
household income will be remitted.
Collier and Lal caution readers to treat their
findings and comments as suggestive, not
conclusive. More extensive and reliable data
will be needed to confirm their hypotheses. But
the Collier and Lal paper does serve to
illustrate the notion that decision-makers must
maintain a critical attitude towards
assumptions, theories, data and ideas in good
currency, particularly if their mission is to
foster change and innovation.
NAIROBI'S SHELTER NEEDS NAIROBI'S URBAN FORM
Nairobi is Kenya's capital city, and with an
estimated population of same 959,000 in 19787,
remains the hub of Kenya's expanding modern
sector. In 1977 Nairobi contained more than
half the nation's wage-earners and close to half
of its urban population. 8  During the mid-and
late-1970's, Nairobi's population was growing by
some 60,000 per year, and at least 10,000
additional dwelling units were needed annually
just to meet this growth.9 At the same time
approximately forty percent of Nairobi's
households were estimated to have a monthly
income of less than K Shs 500 (US $70 approxi-
mately)1 0 A report published by the University
of Nairobi's Housing Research and Developnent
Unit (H.R.D.U.) in 1971 suggested that one-third
of Nairobi's population lived in uncontrolled or
spontaneous housing and there are many more
families who share single rooms in overcrowded
public housing.11 The majority of uncontrolled
settlements in Nairobi lack adequate safe water
supplies and basic sanitation. 1 2
With the coming of National Independence in
1963, Nairobi was transformed overnight from a
settler capitall3 to the capital of a proud,
independent African nation state. The new city
administration and the national government
inherited a city which had literally been
built from scratch to primarily serve the
interests of the colonial settlers. White
supremacy, racial discrimination and
segregation, isolation and control of Africans,
separation of land uses by function, the impact
of transportation technology (railway and
automobiles) and the Garden City movement,
inter alia, were all evident in Nairobi's urban
form.
Paricularly in residential areas, racial segre-
gation was one of the primary goals of the
colonial administration. The stratification of
Nairobi's major residential areas was achieved
through a combination of public policy, private
agreements, cultural preferences and economic
26
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forces. Distinct African, Asian and European
areas emerged which were characterised by sharp
differences in level of services and facilities,
density, income, dwelling construction and
environmental quality.
A graphic account of the deplorable living
conditions of Africans is given by one Kenyan
African writer:
In the African locations there were
poor lights in the streets. Library
facilities and social halls were ill-
equipped. Public lavatories were
very, very dirty. Some of them did
not have running water. Instead,
they had hard tins like dustbins in
which people "eased" themselves.
There was an inescapable offensive
smell when these bins were full of
faeces, and especially when the muni-
cipal workers who removed them were
late (as they always were). One
public lavatory was used by over a
thousand people.
In the African houses there were no
lights, water supplies, or gas for
cooking. The Africans used paraffin
or kerosene oil lamps, charocal fires
for cooking, and water drawn in tins
or emptied oil drums.
In each African location there was
a water tap where long queues of
people lined up with their tins and
drums. If you wanted to cook a quick
meal, it was impossible unless you
had some spare water in the house.
Like public lavatories, one water
centre served about one thousand
people and was open only three times
a day. You could see three or four
columns of queues around one centre.
Some people had to line up with their
tins and drums about fifteen minutes
to six in the morning. The last hour
of closing the centre was seven in the
evening. The water was supplied by
one pipe.1 4
In addition to the deplorable housing condi-
tions, Africans generally lacked access to
medical and educational facilities. An example
of the complete injustice prevailing in that
social system is provided by the observation
that, in 1955 more than fourteen times as much
was spent on a European child's education and
three and on half times as much on an Asian
child's education as on that of an African
child.1 5 When services or facilities were
provided in African locations, they were
primarily motivated by a desire to limit the
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necessity for the native to frequent other parts
of Nairobi. Africans were also denied access to
the city's better hotels, restaurants, bars,
clubs and the like. Social interaction between
the different races was all but non-existant.
During the post-Independence era, decision-
makers have exercised a policy of dualism for
the purposes of shaping Nairobi's growth and
developnent. Substantial progress has been made
in terms of giving Africans increased access to
housing, social services, and educational and
employment opportunities. As this thesis
documents, increasing attention has been given
to addressing low-cost shelter needs in Nairobi,
especially during the 1970's. Meanwhile,
economic stratification has replaced racial
stratification. Areas which were predominantly
African prior to Independence have remained so,
and are now the domain of the lower-income
sectors of the African population. Residential
areas, previously the exclusive territory of
Europeans and Asians, now accomodate the growing
ranks of the African middle-class, and the
African business, professional and political
elite.
Official attitudes and actions have served to,
both directly and indirectly, preserve and
promote this type of stratification. Overall
public expenditure programs have favored the
interests of the advantaged over the needy. The
emphasis on more expensive tenant-purchase
housing schemses is a case in point.
A brand-new international airport, complete
with all the latest electronic gadgetry, was
built in the mid 1970's. Resources continue to
be poured into catering for the needs of a
growing tourist and convention industry. Housed
in a luxurious new facility, the United Nations
Environment Program is headquartered in Nairobi,
and increasing numbers of multi-national
businesses have recently set up regional bases
in the city. High-rise hotels and offices have
mushroomed across downtown Nairobi, and the
34
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infrastructure has had to be upgraded. The city
is viewed as one of Africa's leading metro-
polises, and there are many decision-makers who
believe that investment in such prestige pays
substantial dividends.
Residential zoning regulations pertaining to
physical factors such as minimum lot size, plot
ratio, maximum lot coverage, minimum dwelling
standards and quality of construction, which
were in effect during the colonial period,
remained intact in priciple and spirit for at
least the first decade of Kenya's post-Indepen-
dence era. According to one estimate, eighty
percent of the residential land in Nairobi was
occupied by twenty percent of the city's
population. 1 6 Under these circumstances, as
Nairobi experienced a tremendous uniflux of
population, the result, naturally, was that
certain areas experienced overcrowding
accompanied by deteriorating environmental
conditions.
by B.M. Kimani of the University of Nairobi,
produced some interesting results.17 Asian,
Europeans, and businesses (predominantly under
the proprietorship of Asians) owned over sixty
percent of the land acreage within the city
boundary.
Africans, who made up eighty-three percent of
Nairobi's population according to the 1969
census, owned a mere 3.9 percent of the city's
land acreage, and much of this consisted of
highly fragmented parcels with a relatively
lower market value. Kimani approximated the
following:
- 1 acre of African-owned land for every
800 Africans;
- 1 acre of Asian-owned land for every
32 Asians;
- 1 acre of European-owned land for every
7 Europeans.
This study provided conclusive evidence of the
fact that colonial land ownership patterns in
A study of landowning in Nairobi in 1970, done
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Nairobi had not been significantly altered by
the early 1970's.
Much of Nairobi's more recent, large-scale
housing development has been located in the
city's eastern periphery. This has come about
as a result of so-called constraints on land in
the other parts of the city: to the north is
valuable agricultural land; to the south is the
Nairobi Wildlife Reserve, a tourist attraction;
and to the west are the existing middle and
upper-income residential areas of varying
densities.
HOUSING FOR AFRICANS
Ironically, Nairobi's first large-scale attempt
at public housing provision for Africans
consisted of a rudimentary site-and-services
scheme of sorts, implemented in Pumwani in
1923.18 During the next four decades however,
other strategies for providing African housing
were employed and the site-and-services idea was
rejuvenated in the mid-fifties. The Kariobangi
site-and-services scheme, the first in Nairobi's
more recent history, eventually commenced in
1964.
The Nairobi Municipal Council and the East
African railways administration began planning
and building accomodation for their African
employees in the mid-and late-1930's. Two
government studies of the housing problems of
Africans, carried out in 1939 and 1942,19 deter-
mined the serious extent of unmet shelter needs,
and post World-War II housing efforts were
re-doubled. Cne of the outcomes was an
increasing emphasis on employer-built housing
for African workers. Employers resasoned that a
better accomodated labor-force would be more
productive. 20 Much of this type of housing took
the shape of single storey barracks facilities
based on the priciple of one bachelor bed-space
per worker. A bed-space was defined as approx-
imately four square meters, enabling three men
to share a single room measuring 3m by 4m.21
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The bed-space concept was based on the belief
that Africans were best-suited for rural living,
and that male workers should be discouraged from
bringing their families to the city. Many
colonialists subscribed to the notion that urban
influences had a corrupting influence on the
average African.22
Around 1952, coinciding with the declaration of
a State of Eknergency, there was a change in the
African housing policy. Realizing that the bed-
space approach had contributed to the creation
of numerous social ills, the colonial admini-
stration called for a program of more family-
oriented housing. The implementation of this
new housing initiative coincided with Nairobi's
pre-independence population influx. The com-
bination of rising demand, increasing scarcity
of resources, and a whole government in
transition, meant that this program never really
gained momentum. Furthermore, the variety of
walk-up apartments, and row-house, semi-detached
and detached type dwelling units were all well
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beyond affordability by the growing numbers of
poor and unemployed in Nairobi. Much of the
public housing built in the 1960's catered
primarily to the needs of the middle-class.
Consequently squatter settlements mushroomed all
over the city. With President Kenyatta
proclaiming that Nairobi's prestige was at stake
and that he did not want the capital city to
become a shanty-town, authorities launched a
massive city-wide clean-up campaign which lasted
over several months in 1970. During this
effort, about 10,000 squatter dwellings were
demolished, and an estimated 50,000 people -
roughly ten percent of the city's total
population - were left hameless.23
During the decade of the 1970' s, the whole
low-cost shelter question received a lot of
attention and the major issues were brought into
sharper focus. This thesis examines part of
this progress and analyses the dynamics of the
process. Thus far, in terms of numbers, the
Kenyan Government's performance in the housing
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DESIGNED ACCORDING 'IO THE "BED-SPACE" PRINCIPLE
~---\
40
IIAm m&~UL
--W---IL I--
IHE
* ill"6
PUMWANI, BUILT c. 1966 KARIOBANGI SOUTH, BUILT c. 1969 KIMATHI, 
BUILT c. 1970
EXAMvPLES OF CONVENTIONAL HOUSING ESTATES
BUILT BY THE NAIROBI CITY COUNCIL 0 50 
100 150
Sources: CATTONI, G. and P. PATEL (1973), and r m =+
SEID, A.L. (1974) METERS
KARIOBANGI SOUTH ESTATE KIMATHI ESTATE
TYPICAL DWELLING PLANS
DESIGNED BY THE NAIROBI CITY COUNCIL
Sources: GATTONI, G. and P. PATEL (1973), and
SEID, A.L. (1974)
41
L
42
field has been dismal. Housing production
during the 1970-74 and 1974-78 Development Plan
periods fell far short of targets. The
1979-1983 Development Plan stated that only
eight percent of the low-cost housing units
planned during the previous plan period had in
fact been completed, and that on average, these
cost five times the original estimate. This
lack of success was partly blamed, on
excessively high and unrealistic standards for
24building design. The 1978-1983 Development
Plan has much less ambitious housing targets
than its predecessor, and the government has
reitterated its commitment to address low-cost
shelter needs:
In urban areas, a major government pro-
gramme will continue to be the develop-
ment of site and service schemes.
Under these schemes the government pro-
vides site development and sewerage,
but the bulk of construction work is
organized on an individual or self-help
basis. In this way costs are kept down
and the available funds are stretched
as far as possible. ...Government
policy continues to discourage squatter
settlements in urban areas. However,
it is also government policy that no
squatter settlements shall be
demolished without providing alterna-
tive housing opportunities for the
people affected.25
The 1979-1983 Plan also called for all urban
authorities to review their housing standards in
order to make them more appropriate for the
settings to which they will be applied and to
reduce them to the minimum consistent with the
provision of low-cost housing needs at
reasonable cost.26
NAIIOBI'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL SETTING
Nairobi's governing institutions bear a clear
imprint of the colonial legacy; they are
modelled after the British local authority
system.27 The local authority consists of an
elected council formally responsible for making
policy, and administrative officers whose duty
it is to implement policy decisions. The
mayorship is not intrinsically powerful,
although through tribal and political afflilia-
tion, and patronage, a considerable amount of
influence may be harnessed. The Nairobi City
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Council (NCC) is under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Local Government whose Minister has
entensive powers to control the council's acti-
vities, particularly in the area of financial
and budgetary matters. Other government
ministries also perform their normal functions ii
Nairobi. Thus as Temple (1973) notes:
...even without considering the role of
private individuals or groups in local
government, we can see that ther are a
variety of potential lines of cleavage
in a local authority organized according
to the British model; between elected
councillors and appointed officers,
among departments, among committees and
between the local authority and the
national government.2 8
While the British local authority model poses
particular problems about the division of
authority and responsibility, public admini-
stration in Kenya faces the whole host of insti-
tutional problems which plague public bureau-
cracies almost everywhere. For any purpose
involving large-scale administration, modern
nation states appear to have no option but to
ultimately adopt some form of bureaucratic model
for the institution concerned. Nothing else
quite seems to have the kind of capacity that
public service delivery systems require in
modern industrial and post-industrial societies.
At the same time, however, bureaucracies seem
particularly vulnerable to organizational patho-
logy.
The essential features of Max Weber's classical
model29 of the modern bureaucracy are as
follows. Overall, there is a clear hierarchy of
positions within a stable structure of legiti-
mate authority. Each position is defined in
terms of its jurisdiction and specific duties.
Duties are governed by a combination of explicit
procedures, objective criteria, rules, regula-
tions, specialized knowledge and the use of
discretion by supposedly trained and experienced
personnel. All the official actions of bureau-
crats are recorded and preserved. Often por-
trayed as a machine, the model is geared for
efficiency, replicability, consistency and
objectivity. Control is a key feature of this
model.
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Weber's model of a bureaucracy is based on
several critical assumptions. The model presup-
poses that individual goals match organiza-
tional goals, or that, at least, the goals of
individuals and organizations are reconcilable.
Weber's model is also based on the assumption
that the society shares a common basis for
rational decision-making and a common respect
for the prevailing form of legitimate authority.
The positions in a bureaucracy are designed on
the basis of generic roles derived from the
decomposition of a complex task. Clearly, the
decomposition or breakdown could be done in a
variety of analytically justifiable ways. There
will always be room for debate and improvement.
But bureaucratic s ructures once in place, are
difficult to dismantle and/or change.
The limitations fo Weber's classical model of
the bureaucracy are widely recognized and
acknowledged. Crozier (1964) diagnoses one of
the main problems of bureaucracy as being the
rigidity of task definition, task arrangements
and the human relations network. The result is
a lack of communication with the environment and
a lack of communication among the group30 Crozier
develops his critique by arguing that:
The resulting difficulties, instead of
imposing a readjustment of the model,
are utilized by individuals and groups
for improving their position in the
power struggle within the organiza-
tion.3 1
In the particular context of developing coun-
tries, the classical bureaucratic model is
ill-suited to the process of rapid and
continuous change that is necessitated by the
demand for accelerated national developnent.
The defficiencies of the bureaucratic system
create severe problems in countries where
government administrative structures are the
most important large-scale developmental tools.
Bottlenecks and low productivity are all too
frequent, and occasionally cause temporary
paralysis of the system. Bureaucratic organiza-
tions are seen as being better adapted to
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problems of control rather than problems of
change.32 This is an important point to note,
especially in the case of countries with a
recent history of colonial domination and rule.
Such countries have inherited bureaucratic
systems from their former oppressors, These
systems were usually primarily designed to
subjucate the masses and maintain control over
them. Independent nations have had great
difficulty in replacing or transforming these
systems.
Efforts to remedy institutional shortcomings and
defficiencies in Kenya are constantly faced with
the dilemua of choosing between centralization
versus decentralization. A World Bank document
sums up the general problem at a metropolitan or
city level as follows:
Creation of autonomous agencies to en-
sure better management of individual
services while improving some operations
may, in the absence of a similar
strengthening of municipal administra-
tion, compound the problem of
integrating policies and determining
appropriate priorities of the urban
center as a whole.3 3
This complicated organizational design task is
made even more difficult by the frequent entry
of political power plays into the decision-
making process.
In this administrative and political context,
policy-making occurs in several ways. There are
occasions when bureaucrats, rather than the
political leadership, make policy. Riggs (1964)
explains how under certain systemic conditions
bureaucrats tend to be projected into
decision-making roles:
Effective policy formation .... requires
that choices be made, among innumerable
desired goals, of those which have a
good prospect of being attained. This,
in turn, requires that two kinds of
information reach the political policy-
makers. First, the political machinery
- elections, party organizations,
legislative procedures, interest group
activity, access to public media of
information and opinion, and so on -
must work well enough to give the
policy-makers an accurate picture of
the degree to which different goals are
desrired by the people, and the extent
to which consensus and willingness to
cooperate in their achievement exists.
46
Second, the administrative machinery
must provide the policy-makers with a
sufficiently reliable picture of
available resources in funds, equipment,
personnel and organization to make
realistic determinations as to which
goals can actually be turned into
accomplishments, or what the practicable
alternatives are.
Impediments in either or both of these
channels of information to the policy-
makers make it impossible for them to
devise true policies. Unfortunately,
policy-makers are not always fully aware
of such impediments and they may, there-
fore, adopt statements and prescribe
programs which turn out, on scrutiny, to
be goals rather than policies, wishes
and proposals rather than effective
demands and laws. When this happens,
the adminisrators have become
quasi-politicians; they have to take
over some of the functions of making
policies.34
Riggs emphasizes the need for politics and
administration to be in equilibrium as a condi-
tion for efficiency.
The strength and importance of the bureaucracy
in Kenya has been actively reinforced. In 1971,
a report published by the Ndegwa Commision
strongly supported the policy-making role of
the bureaucracy:
In Kenya .... (there) is one overwhelm-
ingly dominant political party which,
experience has shown, does not itself
fomulate new policies; other organiza-
tions which could contribute to policy-
formulation are relatively few and weak;
and the dependence of the economy on
government activity for ensuring rapid
growth is even more marked than in
industrialized societies. We therefore
consider it to be not only inevitable but
essential that the Civil Service should
be called upon to assume even greater
responsibility for managing the economy
and for identifying and solving national
problems.3
However, as will be seen later, public policies
without political support are generally unlikely
to have a widespread or lasting effect.
Another view is that in the policy-making
process, the bureaucracy is at the mercy of the
powerful politicians, and that civil servants
tend to tailor their views to suit their
political masters.36 Mutual suscipicioi,
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division and power struggles abound under such
circumstances and th functioning of the
bureaucracy is adversely affected.
Ethnicity usually forms the basis for most
social and political organization in Kenya, and
Nairobi's multi-ethnic society clearly reflects
this phenomenon.37 Politicians usually derive
the bulk of their support from constituents who
belong to the same ethnic group as themselves,
and the tribal overtones of political campaigns
are frequently evident. Political spoils are
generally divided up on the basis of tribal
membership. Ethnicity is also an important
variable in determining one' s advancement in
business and professional circles. In most
competitive situations, ethnic group membership
will serve as the informal basis for the
distribution of jobs, housing, and public
services.
Within the African community, ethnicity, how-
ever, differentiates individuals less spatially
than in terms of social and political choices.
Spatial differentiation in Nairobi is, and
becoming even more so, a function of social
status in general, and wealth in particular; the
willingness to pay for the location and quality
of accomodation. Thus, while tribal differ-
ences, divisions and loyalties remain strong,
the social order has been impacted by emergent
polarization along class lines. Furthermore, as
Ross (1975) comments:
Political participation in Nairobi has
moved from the mass base that character-
ized politics in the independence struggle
to a narrower, more elitist foundation in
the postindependence period. The mass
participation structures of electoral and
party politics have been left to wither
away as technical elites and powerful
individuals seek to secure their hold on
political office. For the most part, mass
participation is seen as disruptive to the
development process and as an obstacle to
resolution of the problems facing the
country. Many leaders argue that most
people do not really understand the
problems facing the country. They suggest
that only a government of enlightened
leaders can ensure progress. If the
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people are too closely involved in the
decision-making process, the argument
continues, they will want to spend money
on relatively tangible projects schools,
roads, clinics, and so on whereas only the
technical elite understands that such
projects must be balanced against the need
for long-term development programs.3 8
Maintenance of the status quo has thus become
a top-priority item in the political elite's
agenda.
Political participation in this environment is
limited, and may be characterized as thus:
there is a great deal of articulation of indivi-
dual demands, but relatively little aggregation
of such demands. 3 9
The advantage of numbers in political expression
is thereby lost. Politics in this setting is as
much symbolic as it is instrumental.4 0 Response
and change are designed to be highly visible.
This is done through publicity, in the mass
media and by word-of-mouth. Tangible, instant
or quick results are preferred wherever
possible, and actions are frequently expedited
for their political capital. Amongst politicians
there is a tendency to equate progress with
modernity and popular aspirations echo a similar
feeling. This has led to circumstances where
economic development has been pursued at sub-
stantial social cost, and in part, this attitude
has fostered a situation where economic growth
has taken place without a marked improvement in
income redistribution.
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THE BLLOMBERG - ABRAMS MISSIN
The numbers of Nairobi's African population
began to swell rapidly in the years immediately
prior to Independence in 1963. Job-seekers
migrated to the city in search of employment,
and families arrived to live with their wage-
earing heads of households. Furthermore, in
1963 the new independent city administration
under its first African Mayor, Charles Rubia,
decided to expand the city boundaries. The
expansion was designed to ensure adequate land
for the city's future residential and commercial
development, as well as to absorb the peri-urban
and dormitory areas occupied by people depending
on the city for employment. This expansion
meant that the area covered by the NCC grew from
8,216 hectares to 68,144 hectares; over an
eightfold increase. The NCC had its hands full
with the business of the political transition
and by 1963, the city's housing program had come
to a virtual standstill. Meanwhile, from 1960
onwards, Nairobi's increasing numbers of poor
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Africans without accommodation began to build
unauthorized shelters on a grand scale. Illegal
settlements comprising of flimsy shanties con-
structed out of discarded materials began to
appear in various parts of the city. Faced with
these immense challenges, the Kenyan Government
called for assistance.
In 1964, Kenya was visited by two experts,
Dr. L.N. Bloomberg and Dr. C. Abrams, appointed
under the United Nations Program of Technical
Assistance. Their mission was:
to conduct a study of short-and long-term
housing needs and to make recommendations
to the Government of Kenya on housing
policies within the framework of social
and economic development planning. 1
The two experts spent several months reviewing
assembled data on housing and urbanization in
Kenya, visiting urban centers across the country
and interviewing various officials in government
ministries, provincial administrations and local
authorities. In total, Bloomberg and Abrams had
discussions with seventy-five government
officials, including Kenya's Prime Minister,
Jcmo Kenyatta. Bloomberg and Abrams submitted
their report in late 1964, and after considering
it, the Kenyan Government adopted it. The
report was published in Nairobi in mid-1965.
In its treatment of both the institutional and
technical aspects of housing programs the report
was comprehensive. The report reviewed the
following aspects: demographic characteristics;
housing quality; current housing operations and
the work of various public housing agencies;
housing finance; and building materials. On the
basis of an assessment of housing need and
demand, a set of housing goals were formulated.
Bloomberg and Abrams analysed the role of
housing in the economy and discussed both
internal and external sources of housing fin-
ance. The report concluded with a series of
recommendations for a national housing program.
While many of the mission's findings indicated a
very grave situation, the report attempted to
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strike a note of cautious optimism about future
prospects for housing in Kenya. In Nairobi, it
was found that forty-four percent of African
households lived in employer-supplied housing.
Much of the housing for Africans was of a com-
paratively low quality, dwellings were small,
and there was severe overcrowding. The
assembled data revealed that in Nairobi fifty-
two percent of the rooms occupied by Africans
accommodated three or more persons. A substan-
tial portion of the African population lived in
dwellings which lacked sanitary facilities. It
was estimated that the average size of an
African household would grow from 4.3 persons to
4.8 person, and that in order to satisfy the
housing needs of African households from 1962
through 1970, 26,300 additional dwelling units
would be required at the rate of over 3,000
units per year. The report noted that the
majority of African urban households had low
incomes and did not have the ability to make the
required monthly payments for conventional
housing; affordability was a very severe
constraint. Amongst its numerous recommen-
dations, the Bloomberg-Abrams report included
the following:2
- The establishment, in the Ministry of Health
and Housing, of a National Housing Authority
which would supersede the existing Central
Housing Board;
- the establishment of a permanent cabinet
committee on housing with the Minister of
Health and Housing as chairman, and at least
the following Ministers as members: Finance
and Economic Planning; Local Government and
Regional Affairs; Commerce and Industry;
Works, Communications and Power; Labor and
Social Services, and Lands and Settlement;
- maximum participation of Local Authorities in
the implementation of a housing program;
- immediate recruitment of a U.N.-sponsored
housing economist;
- making a concerted effort to obtain large sums
of external aid;
- undertaking a comprehensive manpower training
program;
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- gearing programs to meet operating expenses,
ensuring repayment of obligations and holding
necessary government appropriations to a
minimum;
- adoption of a flexible housing program incor-
porating site-and-services schemes, and up-
grading projects;
- the establishment of a mortgage finance insti-
tution which should make intensive efforts to
attract private savings;
- research into low-cost building materials and
construction techniques.
The report strongly emphasized the desirability
of a decentralized housing program. It men-
tioned that:
Experience has consistently demonstrated
that success of a housing programme is a
direct function of the closeness of
operations to the people for whom it is
intended.3
The report also observed that at the time of the
of the mission there was only one qualified
African architect in the whole of Kenya,4 and
that this situation had to be remedied as soon
as possible. Stren (1978) suggests that perhaps
the most significant single recommendation made
by the mission was the establishment of a
national housing authority within a new Ministry
of Housing.5 The new authority, it was recom-
mended, should have more power and financial
resources than the existing Central Housing
Board. The task of the new authority was to
both coordinate and initiate development by
local authorities.
The inclusion of Charles Abrams in the U.N.
mission to Kenya is noteworthy. Just prior to
visiting Kenya, Abrams had published hais
seminal book, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an
Urbanizing World. 6 In the field of urbanization
and housing in developing countries, he was
widely known and well regarded. He had already
served on similar U.N. missions to Ghana,
Turkey, the Philipines, Pakistan, Nigeria,
Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Singapore and Bolivia.
He had also been on assignments to Venezuela,
Barbados, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Colombia. It
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would not be incorrect to assert that Charles
Abrams had become a highly respected veteran in
this businesss, and that government officials
tended to listen to his advice with an attentive
ear.
The Kenyan Government acted upon many of the
major suggestions of the Bloomberg - Abrams
report. Following a major cabinet reorganiza-
tion in May 1966, President Jomo Kenyatta
created a new Ministry of Housing and appointed
a new minister. When the National Development
Plan was revised in 1966, an expanded housing
program was given high priority. Plans for the
creation of a National Housing Corporation were
set in motion, and substantial funds were
budgeted for its use in the 1966/70 Plan period.
Seven categories of housing were specified in
the Plan, and although priorities were not made
explicit, the presentation in the Plan empha-
sized low-income and owner-occupied schemes. 7
The government's housing policy was elaborated
in Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1966/67. This
paper stated the need for housing with greater
urgency: The Government accepts that the
housing situation in the main towns has now
reached a critical stage and that urgent
measures must be taken to solve it.8 A Housing
(Amendment) Bill setting up the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) was brought before Parliament
in June 1967. Another recommendation of the
Bloomberg - Abrams report was the establishment
of a mortgage finance institution. The govern-
ment incorporated the Housing Finance Company of
Kenya (H.F.C.K.) in 1965 to provide mortgage
finance to assist eligible individuals with the
construction of new homes or the purchase of
already existing units.
THE NATICAL HOUSIG CORPORATICi
The Housing Act of 1953 was appropriately
ammended and on July 4, 1967 the Central Housing
Board was transformed into the National Housing
Corporation (NHC). Parliament desired that the
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NHC should make a qualitative break with the
past and that it should have a new image in
playing a role which is in keeping with the
spirit of the new, independent Kenya. The new
image and role were shaped in a number of ways
which are described below.
The most important new power of the NHC was its
ability to undertake housing construction on its
own, without working through a local authority.
This power was given teeth by the allocation of
substantial funds to the corporation by the
government. The membership of the NHC's execu-
tive board was increased to be more responsive
to political representation. The new board con-
sisted of Members of Parliament, prominent mem-
bers of the public and senior civil servants.
An American-educated African was appointed
General Manager in 1965 and he strove to create
an organization with an active, dynamic, and
modern image. According to Stren (1978):
The more public and political composition
of the NHC undoubtedly increased both its
"visibility" throughout the country and
the degree to which it represented
African middle-class interests. 10
The Developnent Plan 1970-1974 recognized that
an imperative need to accelerate the creation of
inexpensive urban housing for the low income
groups.11 The Plan started that ....because
four-fifths of the urban demand is for dwellings
costing under K Shs 24,000, it has been decided
that all Government lending through NHC will be
for projects designed to produce houses at that
figure or below. 1 2 The NHC was thus to be the
main government agency responsible for low-cost
housing. However, as Stren (1978) notes:
... even by the government's own calcula-
tions, this was hardly much of a con-
cession to the "low income groups"
because only 17 percent of the urban
population could afford a house costing
more than K Shs 24,000. As a gesture to
the very lowest income groups, the plan spe-
cified that 33 percent of the NHC funds
allocated would have to spend on sites-
and-services schemes rather than on con-
ventional housing.13
The 1970-1974 Plan allocated K Shs 253.8 million
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to the NHC. The NHC' s allocation in the
Developnent Plan 1974-1978 was K Shs 508.8
million, almost double the amount allocated
during the previous Plan period. During the
1974-1978 Plan period the NHC was expected to
ensure the production of 68,000 additional
housing units throughout the country. As in the
previous Plan period, all NHC funds were ear-
marked for the construction of units costing not
more than K Shs 24,000. In addition, the pro-
portion of funds to be spend on site-and-
services was increased to 61 percent of the
NHC's budget.14 During the 1974-1978 Plan
period, the Government also determined a minimum
standard for dwelling units constructed in urban
areas. According to the Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry of Housing and Social Services
(MoHSS):
The Government considers the minimum re-
quirement for a decent home to be home
to be a habitable two roomed house
constructed of permanent materials with a
separate kitchen and basic sanitary faci-
lities such as toilet and shower compart-
ment.15
The MOHSS had conducted an Urban Housing Needs
Study in 1973 which revealed that 89 percent of
the urban population could not afford a house
consisting K Shs 24,000, assuming that a family
spent twenty percent of its income on housing.
This same study had found that certain income
groups did, in fact, spend up to 40 percent of
their income on housing.1 6 Between 1973 and
1975, the construction cost of residential
buildings rose by as much as 55 percent and the
minimum cost of a site-and-service plot jumped
from K Shs 6,000 to K Shs 9,000.17 Realizing
that increasing emphasis would have to be placed
on site-and-services if there was to be any hope
of meeting the demand for afforable shelter, the
Government engaged Dr. Iobert Merrill, an
international housing consultant, in 1975.
Merrill's task was to recommend organizational
machinery which would enable the NHC to better
carry out its responsibilities vis-a-vis sites-
and-services schemes as spelt out in the
Development Plans. After spending a month with
the NHC, Merrill submitted a detailed report.
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on the basis of this report the NHC compiled a
manual for local authorities entitled Site and
Service Schemes: Guidelines for an Administra-
tive Procedure. This set of guidelines for a
standardised administrative procedure covered
items such as the following: loans and repay-
ments; building standards; house types; density
and lot sizes; advertisement of the scheme;
application and allocation procedures; lot
occupation agreements; tenure arrangements;
provision of technical assistance to allottees;
materials loans; project management, and so on.
The guidelines have been described as a very
useful18 document, both for NHC staff as well as
the local Authorities, and since then, have been
used in the implementation of several pilot slum
upgrading projects. Furthermore, the NHC esta-
blished a site-and-services department within
its organizational structure. Through field
officers and site supervisors, the NHC began
providing assistance to Local Authorities and
project beneficiaries.
Prior to the Merrill report, the only major
study of site-and-services had been carried out
by the H.R.D.U. in 1971 in response to a request
made by the NHC.1 9 The results of the study
were to be used for developing prototypes and
standards for the planning and implementation of
the large number of schemes programed for the
1974-1978 Development Plan, Period. Sample
surveys were done in twelve existing and planned
schemes all over Kenya. The problems experi-
enced by these twelve schemes were high-lighted,
and recommendations were made on how to overcome
these problems. Included in the set of forty-
seven recommendations were the following:
- Dwellings in site-and-services schemes be re-
quired to comply only with the Grade II
Building By-laws (amongst other things, Grade
II meant that structures could be constructed
of mud and timber, and pit latrines could be
used).
- Local authorities be given maximum freedom to
determine dwelling and plot sizes according to
demand;
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- Plots should be allocated only to people who
can document their ability to develop, and who
in the local authority's opinion will remain
owner-occupiers;
- Individuals unable to afford development
should be served by the principle of alloca-
tion by the room where a plot would be allo-
cated to a group with some common bond;
- Type-dwellings be designed in consultation
with the future residents whenever possible;
- Absentees landlordism be made illegal;
- Further research should be carried to quantify
the term ability to develop which is commonly
used as a criterion for allocation.
PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES &
PROGRAMS
During the 1970-1974 Development Plan period,
the NHC was allocated K Shs 84.67 million which
was to be spent on a site-and-services shemes.
In acutal fact, the NHC spent only K Shs 12.78
million on site-and-service schemes, and
completed 3,830 units at an average cost of K
Shs 3337 per unit.20
During the same period, the NHC spent K Shs
267.8 million on conventional housing projects.
The NHC completed 8,941 conventional housing
units at an average cost of K Shs 29,952 per
unit, well above the ceiling of K Shs 24,000
per unit as specified in the Development
Plan.21 For K Shs 267.8 million, close to
67,000 site-and-services units could have
completed at an average cost of K Shs 4,000 per
unit.
Overall, the 1970-1974 Plan had a planned output
of 50,000 housing units to satisfy an estimated
urban housing demand of 10,000 units per annum.
The actual housing output was more in the reg ion
of 25,000 units.22
The 1974-1978 Development Plan set a target for
the completion of 60,000 site-and-services units
at an estimated cost of K Shs 420 million. By
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the end of 1977, a mere 3,195 site-and-service
units had been completed at an average cost of
approximately K Shs 17,500 per unit. While the
planned output for the plan period was 69,000
units, the actual output was a dismal 9,000
units at a cost of K Shs 380 million.23
Between 1973 and 1977, the total public urban
housing expenditure was K Shs 340.54 million.
Of this amont K. Shs 30.48 million was spent on
site-and-services schemes, a paltry 0.06 per-
cent. The H.R.D.U. has rightly characterized
this type of expenditure as a drop in the
ocean.2 4 In an evaluation of stress in Kenya,
the H.R.D.U states that
the success of the program is, to a great
extent, determined by the volume of the
available financial resources. The site-
and-service program should.....be placed
on a higher priority.....in the overall
economic and financial planning. 26
By most accounts, the performance of the Kenya
Government in general, and the NHC in parti-
cular, in the area of low-cost shelter provi-
sion, has been poor. In recent years, however,
there appear to be some signs that the NHC seems
to have better recognized its responsibility to
the urban poor, although its performance in
terms of output is still grossly insufficient.
The NHC's general manager feels that political
opposition is to blame. As he puts it:
Politicians, both at local and national
levels, are anxious to see their consti-
tuents housed in modern buildings con-
structed to a reasonbly high standard;
and in many urban areas there is opposi-
tion in priciple to the concentration of
housing development in Site and Service
Schemes. This opposition must be over-
come to enable the (Site and Service
Scheme) Programme to be satisfactoritly
completed. So, some means must be sought
to reconcile the views between what is
politically and socially desirable on the
one hand and, on the other, what is eco-
nomically possible.
Some internal factors which may help to account
for the NHC's dismal performance, lie in the
corporation's self-image. The Kenyan Parliament
was, at least in the NHC's earliest days,
responsible for creating and fostering this
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image.28 The NHC's first African General
Manager, appointed in 1965, was instrumental in
creating an image of an active, dynamic, and
modern organization according to one
observer. 2 9 Some indication of this indi-
vidual's leadership and impact on the
organization's activities may be inferred from
the following incident. In 1967, when the NHC
was still formally its colonial predecessor, the
Central Housing Board, the organization's Chief
Architect is quoted as having made the following
statement at a housing conference:
Most towns have back areas which can be
used for sites and services schemes where
they will at least be hidden from the
sight of the majority of the popula-
tion.30
That a senior official saw fit to make pejora-
tive remarks in public about site-and-service
schemes is, perhaps, indicative of prevailing
attitudes. The NHC's desire to project a
modern corporate image was also evident in its
decision to build a new ten-storey office
building in a prestigious area of downtown
Nairobi. Only part of this building was to be
used for accommodating the NHC. The architect
chosen to design the building had an acknow-
ledged penchant for the spectacular and the
expensive. Completed in 1977, the building was
a reinforced concrete and glass architectural
tour-de-force with elaborate and costly
finishes and fittings.
64
FOOTNOTES
1 BLOOMBERG, L.N. and C. ABRAMS, United
Nations Mission to Kenya on Housing (U.N.
Commision for Tlechnical Assistant, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, 1964),
p.l.
2 Ibid., pp. 32-58.
3 Ibid. , p. 37.
4 Ibid., p. 35.
12 Ibid., p. 514.
13. STREN (1978), op. cit., pp. 219-220.
14 Ibid., p. 220.
15 MATHEKA, G.M., Kenya's Housing Policy in
Build Kenya, Journal of the Architectural
Association of Kenya, December 1976, p. 12.
16 Ibid., p. 12.
5 STREN, R.E., Housing the Urban Poor in
Africa: Policy, Politics, and Bureaucracy
in Mombasa (Berkeley: Institute of Inter-
national Studies, University of California,
1978), p. 217.
6 ABRAMS, C., Man's Struggle for Shelter in an
Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MA: The
M.I.T. Press, 1970).
7 Quoted in STREN (1978), op. cit., p. 217.
8 Quoted in ibid., p. 218.
9 Quoted in ibid., p. 2318.
10 Ibid., p. 219.
11 KENYA, Development Plan, 1970-1974
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969), p. 507.
17 Ibid., p. 12.
18 CHANA, T.S., P. HOULBERG, J. HAGGER, G.J. de
KRUIFF and A. IMOMIRE, Evaluation of the
Site and Services Programme in Kenya
(Nairobi: Housing Research and Development
Unit, University of Nairobi 1979), p. 19.
19 HOULBERG, P., N.O. JORGENSEN and R. STEELE,
Site and Service Schemes: Analysis and
Report (Nairobi: Housing Research and
Development Unit, Universtity of Nairobi,
1971).
20 STREN, R.E., Urban Policy in BARKAN, J.D.
and J.J. Okumu (editors), Politics and
Public Policy in Kenya and Tauzauia (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 182.
21 Ibid., p. 182.
65
22 Ibid., p. 183.
23 CHANA et al (1979), op. cit., p. 38.
24 Ibid., p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 33.
26 Ibid., p. 4.
27 Quoted in STREN (1979), op. cit., p. 184.
28 STREN (1978), op. cit., p. 218.
29 Ibid., p. 219.
30 Quoted in BEAREMORE, R.M., Sites and
Services: A Strategy for Kenyan Urban
Development, unpublished M.C.P. thesis
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1978), p. 41.
0tl eoloI
67
THE KARIOBANGI SITE-AND-SERVICES SCHEME
The Kariobangi site-and-services scheme was
Nairobi's first post-Independence experiment
with the site-and-services concept. Begun in
1964, soon after Kenya formally achieved inde-
pendence on December 12, 1963, the scheme had
been originally conceived over a decade ago. The
impetus to implement the Kariobangi scheme was
renewed by the need to relocate squatters who
had been displaced from various areas close to
the city center by the new African authorities.
A press release publicizing the scheme stated
the following:
Offers of sites in Kariobangi will be
made to the present owners of illegal
dwellings and those whose unfinished
houses have been demolished....
The ministers wish to emphasize.. .it is
an opportunity for the poorer people to
acquire land and services at a very low
price. It is not designed for absentee
landlords and care must be taken to see
that there is non-profiteering...
Those who go into the scheme will be
permitted to have lodgers in their
houses, but not more than two rooms may
be used for this purpose.1
The project was located in the city's eastern
periphery, eight kilometers from downtown.
Planned and designed by the NCC's City
Engineer's Department, the scheme consisted of a
total of 723 lots. Every single lot had the
same area -167 m2 -and dimensions -12.2 m by
13.7 m. Groups of four lots shared a contractor
-built sanitary facility consisting of toilets,
water outlets and wash-slabs. These sanitary
facilities were constructed at the intersections
of lot boundaries.
The land parcel used for the Kariobangi scheme
was given as a free grant by the Kenyan Govern-
ment on a ninety-nine years lease. Financing
for 500 lots was provided by the Central Housing
Board (later superseded by the NHC), with the
remaining 223 plots financed by NCC funds. 2
Plot allocation was the responsibility of the
Valuation Section in the NCC's 7bwn Clerk's
Department. Allottees were selected from a
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waiting-list comprised mainly of squatters.
The duration of the leasehold varied according
to the following conditions:
- ten years if the dwelling was constructed in
temporary materials;
- fifty years if the dwelling was constructed,,
or reconstructed in permanent materials.3
Dwelling construction, to be undertaken by the
allottees, was subject to the following regula-
tions:4
(1) Completion of temporary structure within
six weeks from allocation, extended time
limit applied for permanent structures;
(2) The houses were to be used as private
dwellings, the lot holders being allowed
to have maximum of two lodgers in the
house;
(3) lotholders were to be responsible for
legal fees, etcetra, in case of lease
extension;
(4) No buildings were to be erected within
three meters of lot boundaries;
(5) Plinth areas were not to exceed fifty
square meters;
(6) The choice of building materials was open,
but roofs were to be of noncombustible
materials approved by the City Engineer,
and construction materials should not
include paper, cardboard, string or the
like.
Some allottees obtained construction loans from
the NCC. In such instances type plans from the
NCC were used as the basis for the design of the
dwelling and the building works was regularly
supervised by the City Engineer's Department.
Some of the allottees organized themselves into
building cooperatives. These cooperatives
purchased their own materials and hired artisans
to build their houses. In some instances allot-
tees also participated in the actual construc-
tion work. Much less frequently were the
dwellings constructed entirely on a self-help
basis.
The majority of dwellings consist of four to six
rooms and the construction is comprised of a
timber frame, mud walls, a sheet-metal roof and
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cement floors. All lots are served by paved
pedestrian walkways, inaccessible to vehicles in
most cases, and vehicular traffic is confined to
the single, paved, loop road running through the
scheme. A waterborne sewer system serves the
scheme, storm water is drained through open
surface channels, and street lighting is
provided.
The Kariobangi project was first conceived in
1954. The Working Party on Illegal Squatting
suggested Kariobangi as an appropriate location
for a site-and-services project which would help
alleviate Nairobi's squatting problems. This
suggestion was made in the immediate aftermath
of the most turbulent period of Kenya's colonial
era. Since 1945 there had been a build-up of
the nationalist movement in Nairobi and the Mau
Mau struggle for Independence led by the Kikuya
tribe, had intensified. The rapidly increasing
outbreaks of violence prampted the colonial
administration to declare a State of Energency
in October 1952, and Nairobi became a military
headquarters of the imperial presence.5 The
diffusion of tension by the indoctrination and
control of the African urban population became
top-priority items on the colonial agenda.
Unplanned squatter settlements were perceived as
the major trouble spots and the thinking at that
time was that resettlement of the squatters into
planned housing areas would make the situation
much more manageable.
Physical determinism appears to have been a
prevalent notion amongst colonial planners.
Evidence of the belief that orderly physical
environments bred orderly citizens is provided
by the following excerpt from an editorial
published in a leading Nairobi newspaper in
February 1953:
The theories of the experts have to be
related to the facts, and the facts are
simply these: that there is no better
breeding ground for crime, no better
forum on which real and imaginary
grievances can be ventillated and
enlarged, than an overcrowded hovel of
"bed spaces" dimly lit by a flickering
oil tin light, with nothing to do in the
early hours of the evening after work but
grumble.6
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public officials in independent Kenya appear to
hold not dissimilar views about physical
determination in residential environments.
Sweeping associations continue to be made
between the visual chaos of flimsy shanties
constructed from scrap materials and disorderly
social conduct. Nairobi's squatter settlements
are viewed by many as pools of vice and crime.
Schon (1980) points out the undeniable influence
that the perceptions or images of problem
contexts have on problem-definition, and
evaluation of project impact.7 In this light,
the official reaction to the eventual outcame of
the Kariobangi scheme, discussed below, is
instructive. The upshot is that a more flexible
attitude must be maintained with regard to the
definition of the planning context and the
response to the results of intervention.
In terms of controllability the isolated
location of the Kariobangi site made it a
logical choice. The site was relatively far
from those residential areas of the city
inhabited primarily by Europeans. Controllabi-
lity may also have been a criterion in the design
of the site layout, apart from the need to have
an economical services network. Blocks of lots
laid out uniformly on both sides of the loop
access road made the work of police patrols
easier by facilitating surveillance. Chana
(1975) suggests that the scheme's layout
is modelled along the lines of a labor camp or
military barracks. 8 The Kariobangi scheme's
decided lack of senstitivity towards user needs,
life-styles and capabilities may be partially
explained by the fact that it was planned and
designed in the years prior to Kenya' s indepen-
dence, at a time when the NCC's City Engineer's
Department contained, few if any, African pro-
fessionals. There was no one who could ade-
quate adequately advocate user interests in the
design decision-making.
Although the NCC had implemented a site-and
services scheme as early as 1923, the Kariobangi
scheme represented the first such project
attempted in Nairobi's recent history. The idea
of site-and-services grew out of a comprehensive
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reappraisal of African urban housing policy in
Kenya. Faced with decreasing funds and an
increased movement of labor to towns the
colonial government had been forced to reassess
the financial basis for providing new African
housing estates. Ernest Vasey, a Nairobi
Alderman, was asked to study the problem and
according to Stren (1972), the Vasey Report in
1950 marks a milestone in official thinking.9
Vasey proposed that, while subsidies would be
necessary in the short-run, the government
should encourage African-owned housing instead
of only rental schemes. Having concluded that
continued heavy public subsidization was finan-
cially impossible, and that employer-built
schemes could only be a marginal expedient, he
outlined the practical steps necessary to imple-
ment large scale African-owned developnent.1 0
Vasey suggested that in every urban center, the
Lands Department should set aside an area for
African housing sizes of plots in such schemes
should be 12.2m by 15.2m, and Africans who were
granted land by the government should be allowed
a forty year lease. If after forty years the
land was not needed for other uses, the lease
could be extended another twenty-five years.
Land rents should be minimal and property main-
tenance was to be the occupier's responsibility,
although special public health regulations would
be applied. To enable Africans to build their
own houses, loans and the supply of sub-sidized
building materials were urged. Where it was
necessary to allow building in temporary
materials, a permanent concrete plinth should be
required. At the end of ten years, occupants
were required to have completed the construction
of a dwelling in permanent materials. Wherever
appropriate, economic rents had to be paid for
the duration of the lease.1
1
Two main objections were raised to this policy
of promoting extensive African-built housing.
There was concern that such residential areas
would pose a serious public health hazard.1
2
This objection was hardly a surprise. Issues of
public health were a constant preoccupation of
many British colonial administrators. Arguments
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based on public health issues were frequently
marshalled to make a case for racial segregation
of residential areas. Colonial Medical Officers
advocated strict adherance to standards govern-
ing density, open space, ventillation, sanita-
tion and the like. Arguments over so-called
public health aspects continue to hinder the
planning and implementation of almost every
low-cost shelter project in Nairobi to this day.
to this day. The other objection to the Vasey
report concerned long-range physical planning
objectives.13 Reservations were expressed
about the ability to enforce land use controls
in such large scale African residential areas.
As such, these areas could become major
obstacles in the establishnent of efficient pat-
terns of urban growth and developnent in the
future. These objections, the sruggle for
Independence and the ensuing political transi-
tion pushed housing lower in the list of
priorities for the colonial administration, and
the Kariobangi project was shelved until the
latter half of the 1060's.
In 1971, the University of Nairobi's Housing
Research and Developnent Unit (H.R.D.U.)
published an evaluation of twelve site-and-
services schemes from all over Kenya. The
Kariobangi scheme was included in the
H.R.D.U.survey, 4 and some of their findings are
presented below.
The main characteristics of the scheme were
found to be its high density (700 persons per
hectare), high percentage of absentee landlords
(94%), high appreciation on buildings, high
turnover on renters and its unpopularity with
the tenants. Most dwellings were rented out by
the room and the prevalent dwelling types were
mere conglomerates of single rooms. According
to the researchers, most of the houses have no
chance or possiblity ever to develop into family
dwellings15 since all circulation was external.
Sanitary facilities were shared by several
households and frequently, they were dirty.
Kariobangi was relatively isolated from jobs or
markets and forty-five percent of those sampled
said that their place of work was located more
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than six miles away. Public transportation
costs were prohibitive for the low-income
residents. 1 6
The NCC's City Engineer indicated that the major
difficulties with the scheme were the following:
- cases where ownership was in dispute;
- frequent transfers of property;
- suspension and enforcement of the terms and
conditions of allocation.1 7
According to the City Engineer:
The scheme was intended to solve the
squatter problem. The plot holders have
since been selling these lots to more
well-off people. Therefore the purpose
of the scheme would appear to have been
defeated.18
The City Engineer proposed that in future, sale
or transfer of plots, once allocated, should be
strictly forbidden.
However, J.R. Harris, a housing economist,
claims that the Kariobangi scheme should not be
termed a failure:
The "socially deserving" were assisted.
In effect, the city council gave them a
gift of money equal to the difference
between the market price of the land and
the nominal allocation charge. Some of
these people used this gift to obtain
better housing than they would otherwise
have had. Others found that they had
other uses that seemed more pressing to
them than Kariobangi standard housing.
1 9
The City Engineer's remarks appeared to be
respresentative of the official perception of
the Kariobangi scheme. Temple (1973) suggests
that the scheme was considered an experiment
which proved to be a failure, and that this
experience contributed significantly to the
negative attitudes towards site-and-services
schemes then held by most African decision-
makers in Nairobi.20 Chana (1975) labels the
Kariobangi scheme as a symbol of colonialism
rejected by African political leaders.2 1
THE MATHARE VALFY REDEVELDPMENT SCHEME
Mathare Valley is Nairobi's largest and most
notorious squatter settlement. Located scme
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five kilometers east of the city's central
business district, the settlement stretches for
about five kilometers along the valley created
by the Gitathuru and Mathare Rivers, and covers
an area of approximately 500 acres. This
squatter area presently accomodates well over
100,000 inhabitants, roughly ten percent of
Nairobi's current population.
The first record of squatters in the Valley
dates as far back as 1921.22 In the 1950's the
Valley became a stronghold of the nationalist
movement and the Mau Mau uprising. During the
State of Eergency declared by the colonial
administration, the 150 or so shanties which
existed there in 1954 were bulldozed, and most
of the inhabitants were put into detention. 2 3
However, after the Energency was lifted, large
numbers of squatters located once again in the
Valley. Qie of the first acts of the new
independent government in 1963 was to try to
clear the area. 2 4 The government announced its
intention and gave the squatters one week to
vacate the area. Considerable oppostion was
immediately aroused. Many of the squatters were
ex-freedom fighters and ex-detainees, and they
had enough political influence to prevent the
demolition. Since then, Mathare Valley has
become a haven for squatters.
Over the years various attempts have been made
to control and/or improve environmental
conditions in the Valley. In 1969 a Pilot
Improvement Scheme was initiated, supposedly at
the specific request of President Jomo Kenyatta.
As Werlin (1974) notes: ... the President's word
is generally enough to get things started in
Kenya.2 5 The reasons behind his request can
only be speculated about. Some observers were
of the opinion that the President, who passed
Mathare Valley frequently on his way to and from
his farm at Gatundu, was concerned about re-
moving the blight. Others felt that he owed a
personal and political debt to the many ex-
freedom fighters, mostly members of the same
tribe as Kenyatta, who lived in the Valley.
Werlin (1974) suggests that imminent elections
may also have prompted this decision
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particularly since the Valley was a stronghold
of the ruling party, the Kenya African National
Union (K.A.N.U.) .26
Volunteer organizations such as the National
Christian Council of Kenya (N.C.C.K.) were
assisting the squatters and setting up self-help
local officials. Amidst all the activity, the
absence of government participation was
conspicuous. Furthermore, the Member of
Parliament whose constituency included Mathare
was an influential politician who advocated the
squatters' interests with vigor.
In June 1969, the then Minister for Housing,
visited Mathare Valley. Accompanying him was a
high-powered group: Nairobi's District
Commissioner; the Commissioner of Squatters;
Nairobi's Mayor; and various officers and
councillors from the NCC.2 7 At the traditional
open-air rally the Minister announced that the
Ministry of Housing would set aside K Shs
2,000,000 for improvement of housing in the
area, and promised that all the people in
Mathare Valley would get free lots and building
materials.2 8 Some weeks previously, the
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Housing
had mentioned the possibility of building timber
houses in the Valley.29
Reaction to the Minister's announcement was
predictable. The population of of Mathare
Valley more than doubled during a sixteen-month
period during 1969-1971, and the Valley's
character was altered drastically and dramati-
cally.3 0 Around the same time, housing
companies, comprised of Mathare residents as
well as outsiders, built a substantial amount of
cheap illegal dwellings which were then rented
out by the room at relatively high rates. The
demand for inexpensive accomodation had
increased tremendously as a result of massive
demolition of squatter dwellings in other parts
of Nairobi during several months in 1970.
Members of housing companies pooled resources,
and collectively purchased the land and
developed the housing. Property values in the
Valley skyrocketed.
MATHARE VALLEY, c. 1970
Source: ETHERTON, D. et at (1971)
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Eventually, the Valley's residents discovered
that the K Shs 2,000,000 which the Minister had
spoken about was not forthcoming.31 This un-
fortunate development undermined the credibility
of government officials and alientated the
Valley's residents. The incident seriously
damaged the basis for future cooperation between
the residents and the authorities. Creating
false hopes, particularly among the disadvan-
taged, can be counter-productive, as this
example serves to illustrate. For public
authorities to regain the confidence of the
disadvantaged and the poor is a long and
difficult task.
There were, however, positive developnents in
other quarters. In November 1969, Nairobi's
City Ehgineer advised the 'Own Planning
Committee that building by-law requirements and
land use zoning policy should be:
revised in such a manner as to facilitate
a proper development to enable Council to
exercise a greater degree of control than
has been possible in the coast. The
capital investment in the Valley was
considerable, and a programme of
improvability should be commenced.3 2
Also in June 1969, the Ministry of Housing
requested the H.R.D.U. to carry out a survey of
the physical aspects of the squatter villages.
Meanwhile, the NCC and the Ministry of
Cooperatives and Social Services had already
embarked on social surveys in various parts of
the Valley. A detailed report of the results of
the H.R.D.U. survey was published in August
1971.33 This report contained a set of concrete
proposals for upgrading the squatter villages,
and suggested a set of administrative guidelines
for the implementation process.34 The results of
the survey documented the tremendous initiative
and effort displayed by the poor in helping
themselves. Symphathetic to their predicament,
the report also attempted to advocate some of
the interests of the squatters. The H.R.D.U.
report called on the authorities to assist,
rather than obstruct, the efforts of the poor to
house themselves, and argued that the burden on
the public sector would be thereby lessened.
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Meanwhile, in January 1970, a proposal was
drafted with the aim of seeking overseas aid for
implementing the so-called improvability
projects with the people of Mathare Valley, and
Kaburini, a smaller squatter settlement in
another part of Nairobi. This was to be a
joint operation involving the Kenyan Government,
the NCC and the N.C.C.K.35 The strategy which
was adopted was a combination of upgrading and
site-and-services. To the established squatter
or illegal areas of the Valley the authorities
were to provide a water supply system, a sewer
system, garbage collection services and basic
street lighting, and vehicle access roads would
be improved. In late 1970, the NCC allocated
K Shs 4,390,000 for the improvements to the
existing villages in Mathare Valley.36 A little
later, in early 1971, the NCC allocated a
further K Shs 36,000,000 for a two-year program
to provide 900 new dwellings and 1,650 site-and
services lots on 115 acres of vacant land in the
Valley's eastern portion. 3 7
During the first half of 1971, unforeseen
circumstances helped to speed up implementation
of the upgrading component of the program.
Cases of cholera were reported elsewhere in
Kenya, and officials feared the outbreak of an
epidemic in Nairobi. Mathare Valley was
considered to be particularly vulnerable due to
the unsanitary conditions prevailing there.38
A World Health Organization team visited Mathare
Valley in March 197139 and recommended that a
crash immunization and improvement program be
launched. The NCC moved immediately; the laying
of a trunk sewer was begun, water pipes were
extended and connections facilitated, and an
improved access road was bulldozed through the
squatter village closest to the adjacent planned
residential area. A Kenyan daily newspaper
summed up the event:
Good luck came to Mathare Valley with the
outbreak of cholera in some parts of the
country. The City Council of Nairobi
decided, as a precautionary measure
against possible spread of disease to
improve the standard of accomodation in
the area and provide certain services
which had not been intended for the
valley.40
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By July 1971, the NCC had committed a total of
K Shs 1,000,000 to continued improvements in
Mathare Valley.4 1  Efforts were also being made
to establish schools and community facilities.
The N.C.C.K. in conjunction with the Kenya
Industrial Estates (a government funded
industrial prcmotion agency) had also begun a
project to establish small-scale enterprises in
the Valley.42
While all this was happening, the NCC's City
Engineer's Department was ploughing ahead with
the planning and design of the proposed
developnent for the vacant land in the Valley.
Referred to as the Mathare Redevelopnent Scheme,
the project basically consisted of core housing,
individually serviced sites, and sites with
communal sanitary facilities.4 3 The core-
housing was originally designed to include a
sanitary core, a kitchen, and one room. Each
unit was designed for convenient expansion. The
idea was that the allottees would themselves
build additional rooms according to their
individual needs, means, preferences and time
schedules. Affordability was a prime
consideration and the initial purchase price of
a core house was significantly lower than for a
complete conventional dwelling. Councillors,
however, opposed the idea of the NNC building
incomplete dwellings, and insisted on costly
revisions which eventually doubled the original
target price. The designers were asked to make
changes such as increasing the floor areas and
heights of rooms, adding ceiling finishes, and
enlargening lot sizes. These houses were
finally sold for K Shs 20,000 each on a tenant-
purchase basis.
4 4
The individually serviced lots each have a
contractor-built sanitary core with a toilet,
shower and wash-slab located in the rear corner
of the plot. Piped water supply and waterborne
sewer system serve each lot. The cost of each
of these lots was less than one-fifth the cost
of each core housing unit. In the communally
serviced area, groups of twenty lots share a
sanitary facility containing six showers and six
toilets. All the serviced lots measure 12.6m by
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10.Om and all the core housing lots measure 7.5m
by ll.2m. In both cases the site layout is such
that lots are in back-to-back rows with service
alleys in between. Provision was made for vehi-
cular access to each lot.
The NCC officers preparing these schemes faced a
constant uphill battle in trying to get their
proposals approved. But the worst was yet to
come. In February 1972 the work on site was
brought to a sudden halt. The NCC was
instructed by the Ministry of Local Government
to cease further construction of housing and
infrastructure; at a point when nearly K Shs
2,000,000 had already been spent on developnent
in Mathare Valley.4 5 Again, the reasons behind
this move were never fully explained. Temple
(1975) suggests that:
A major precipitating factor behind this
decision appears to have been dissatis-
faction with the houses in the tenant
purchase scheme.... the way in which the
houses are situated gives them an appear-
ance of high density....4L
Che can only surmise that since the scheme
appears to have been initiated at President
Kenyatta'a suggestion, he felt personally
resposible and was thus unwilling to support any
outcome which was less than satisfactory
according to his personal judgement.
Various other factors also contributed to the
scheme's lack of overall success. As both
Temple (1973) and Werlin (1974) note, most of
the impetus came from expatriates working in
official or voluntary capacities.4 7 The
wholehearted support of the powerful African
bureaucrats and politicians was lacking, and
quite probablly, was not sought or mobilized in
the first instance. Bureaucratic and admini-
strative malaise appears to have dogged the
scheme throughout its duration. Councillors and
senior officers were unable to develop consis-
tent policies. Technical personnel therefore
often worked without proper guidelines or in-
structions, and were subjected to frequent and
unexpected changes. Communication and coordina-
tion and coordination both between the various
NCC departments, and City Hall, site super-
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visors, the Central Government, and the private
sector was incredibly slow, if not non-existent.
one expatriate in the NCC observed that there
would appear to be above 50 people with powers
of delay and approximately half this number with
powers of veto.48 Another participant, an ex-
patriate social worker with the N.C.C.K.,
expressed the following opinion: A clear
designation of leadership was never made, and
no one was delegated the task of creating a com-
mon ground of factual information among parti-
cipants.4 9 According to another expatriate
planner, the biggest problem for the resident
staff of the NCC's Department of Housing and
Social Services was the attitude of the depart-
ment's leadership, which apparently displayed a
singular disinterest in the project and thorugh-
out was politically less than courageous, pre-
ferring to avoid making controversial decisions
whenever possible. 50
Despite the various setbacks and ever-mounting
problems, Mathare Valley has continued to grow
and function as a habitat for a large propor-
tion of Nairobi's poorest inhabitants. A
revised version of the Redevelopment Scheme was
included as part of the implementation package
for the World Bank's Second Urban Project in
Kenya, and scheduled to commence in 1978. This
latest development plan is more refined and
comprehensive than its predecessor. Notable
aspects of this plan include the following:
- Households displaced from the upgrading areas
will be resettled in the nearby site-and-
services location. No dwellings will be
demolished until alternative lots for the
displaced households are ready.
- Lots small enough to be affordable by the
poorest are emphasized.
- Minimum standards of construction have been
lowered.
- An integrated walkway system connected to an
open space spine along the Mathare River will
be developed.
- Throughout the implementation process the
Valley's present residents, political leaders
and local social agencies and groups will be
frequently informed and consulted. This
90
participation and cooperation effort will be
the task of the Community Developnent Section
of the NCC' s newly formed Housing Developnent
Department. 5 1
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A MODEL PIRJECT
The Dandora Community Developnent Project (DCDP)
in Nairobi is Kenya's first large-scale attempt
to plan, program, design and implement a low-
cost solution to the urban shelter problem. A
multiphased site-and-services scheme, the DCDP
consists of 6,000 lots and related community
facilities, and is expected to ultimately
accomodate anywhere in the region of 60,000 -
100,000 residents. The DCDP is being financed
by the Government of Kenya and the World Bank
(made up of the international Bank for Recon-
struction and Developnent - IBRD - and the
International Developnent Association -IDA), and
the implementation is being handled by the
Nairobi City Council, with the assistance of
various professional consultants. Phase one of
the DCDP - approximately 1,000 lots - made up
the so-called First Urban Project in Kenya, the
first in a series of urban projects in Nairobi
and other urban centers to be take undertaken
with considerable support and involvement by the
World Bank. The First Urban Project was
intended to be a model for future large-scale
urban residential developnents in Kenya. As
such, the project hoped to break a lot of new
ground and incorporate a substantial amount of
learning -by-doing.
The DCDP site is located approximately eleven
kilometers northeast of downtown Nairobi on a
large tract of previously vacant land. As
originally planned, some of the lots were to be
affordable by households earning as little as K
Shs. 280 (US $37) per month.
Construction work on the project commenced in
October 1975. Phase Ce of the DCDP was
completed, and 1029 lots were formally handed
over to the first batch of allottees in November
1976. After considerable delays and rises in
costs, construction of the on-site infrastruc-
ture for Phase two began in April 1978. A more
or less detailed account of the DCDP story up
to this point is presented below.
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PRxECr INCEPTI
The needs of the DCPD were planted with the
establishment of the Nairobi Urban Study Group
(NUSG) in November 1970. The study, conceived
initially as a response to the need for a stra-
tegy to develop Nairobi's metropolitan
infrastructure, quickly turned into a full-scale
comprehensive planning exercises funded in part
by the United Nations Development Program.
International agencies such as the World Bank,
the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the
United States Ajency for International
Development had already provided funds for
several NCC projects. Faced with growing fiscal
pressures the NCC
....hoped that a comprehensive urban
development plan, prepared primarily by a
team of international experts, would be
useful in attracting even more inter-
national assistance to finance projects
in Nairobi.1
The primary aims of the study were expressed as
follows:
(i) To develop a preferred structure for the
future city and to establish policies
and strategies which would guide further
development.
(ii) To prepare a Development Plan covering
the period 1974-1979 which would in
essence be the capital works programme
for this period. The plan would assist
financiers and others involved in the
development process and would be sub-
mitted to International Agencies for
review and evaluation.2
The NUSG was to devise a preferred strategy for
the long term (say year 2000) physical growth of
the greater urban area and prepare urban
structure plans for the medium term (1979 and
1985).3 The study program also stipulated that
draft policies for the encouragement and
control of growth in the economy, employment,
transportation, social activity and so on4
would be developed.
The NUSG consisted of about fifteen professionals
- mostly expatriates - a few Kenyan trainees and
a small group of support staff. Tleam members
were drawn from a variety of sources including:
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the 'bwn Planning Section, Nairobi City Council;
the British consult consultants, Colin Buchanan
and Partners; technical assistance personnel
provided by the United Nations Developnent
Program; researchers from the Institute of
Developnent Studies, University of Nairobi;
social workers from the National Christian
Council of Kenya. Various other foreigners who
were carrying out academic research worked with
the NUSG as unpaid research associates, with
somewhate unfortunate results in some cases.
with American Peace Corps volunteers also worked
with the study group. Areas of expertise or
interest included transportation and land use
planning, economics and sociology. A budget of
K Shs 4.6 million was allocated and the work was
scheduled to run fran November 1970 until March
1973. The extension of the study and the
recruitment of additional technical assistance
personnel increased the ultimate cost to well
over K Shs 5 million.5
At about the same time, the World Bank was
reconsidering its policy on providing develop-
ment assistance for urban sector projects. The
World Bank realized that:
In its early years, limited resources,
emphasis on projects of high priority in
terms of output, and on strong borrowing
organizations (strong both administra-
tively and financially), restricted the
types of the Bank's urban-oriented
projects.6
Recognizing the scale and intensity of current
urban problems in developing countries, the
World Bank decided to supplement its activities
in individual sectors with a more direct focus
on problems of urbanization7  The World Bank's
objectives in the urban sector included the
following:
(a) to demonstrate low-cost technical
solutions for shelter, infrastruc-
ture, and transport which were
affordable to the urban population
and could be progressively improved
over time;
(b) to demonstrate that it was possible
to provide services for the urban
poor on a non-subsidized basis;
(c) to demonstrate the feasibility of
comprehensive "urban" planning and
investment programming procedures
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suitable for rapidly changing urban
conditions;
(d) to demonstrate the replicability of
the above solutions.8
The Wolrd Bank's new approach to urban problems
was formally presented in the Urbanization
Sector Working Paper published in June 1972.9
Housing was one of the main areas in the Bank's
proposed program of activities. Bnphasis in
this area was going to be placed on site and
services and similar projects to provide
urbanized land on which the occupants can build
their own dwellings using self-help methods. 10
The Bank's opinion was that:
...for most developing countries, the
harnessing of the self-help and savings
potential provides the only realistic
possibiity for substantial alleviation
of housing conditions.1 1
Poverty alleviation and instruction building
were to be major long-term goals, and
apparently the Wrld Bank anticipated that at
the outset initial individual projects would
achieve only Limited results. 12
As a result of this new thinking, the IBRD's
Special Projects Department was looking for pro-
mising opportunities to finance urban develop-
ment efforts. The IBRD has already funded the
extension of Nairobi's water-supply system, and
reconnaisance missions had visited the city in
1969 and 1971 to explore the possibility of a
suitable project. The desire on the part of the
Government of Kenya and the NCC to attract
foreign capital, and the World Bank's willing-
ness to supply it under appropriate lending con-
ditions, led to the two parties signing an
agreement in March 1971.
Under this agreement the NCC made a formal com-
mitment to emphasize the goals of economic
equity, as well as growth, in its metropolitan
developnent strategy and planning proposals.
Programs and projects were to incorporate income
redistribution in favor of low-income groups as
a prime objective. The NCC also agreed to pre-
pare a pre-feasibility for a comprehensive
urbanization project. This project was to
involve the provision of serviced sites for
residential use by low-income occupants, related
community facilities, commercial and industrial
opportunities and squatter upgrading. The work
on the pre-feasibility project was to be done in
parallel with the Nairobi Urban Study, and fit
well into the city's proposed framework for
future metropolitan development.
The Nairobi Urban Study, however, proved to be a
disappointment, at least in its earlier stages.
Both Temple (1973)13 and Werlin (1974)14 point
out various problems and deficiencies with both
the Group's composition, organization and
leadership, and the study's methodology. Temple
goes so far as to comment that the study was so
ineptly organized, and its methodology was so
inappropriate for planning in a rapidly changing
city in a developing country, that its failure
was inevitable. 1 5 one of the participants in
the study, an American Peace-Corps volunteer,
expressed the following opinion:
... expatriates speak one language, poli-
ticians and administrators another. The
gulf between the two is immense. 1 6
The bewildering variety of participants in
the study also proved to be a serious
handicap. Group consensus on the study's
goals and objectives was lacking and
control. This entirely unsatisfactory state
of affairs prompted the NCC's expatriate
Deputy City Engineer to initiate the
preparation of an interim urbanization
project, a proposal that would hopefully
have a better chance of implementation in
the not too-distant future. By focusing on
a concrete project proposal with clearer,
more modest objectives, it is likely that
the Deputy City Engineer hoped to reduce the
amount of debate and conjecture.
Working with staff from the City Engineer's
Department, and students from the University
of Nairobi, he put together a draft report
calling for the development of a community
for 60,000 people to be located on one of
several possible sites in what was
designated the city's Eastern Extension
Area. In 1971, a physical development plan
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had been developed for this area by a firm
of local consultants, Menezes and Partners,
in collaboration with the NCC.17 Drawing on
information from this physical development
plan, and the socio-economic data compiled
by the Nairobi Urban Study, the Deputy City
Engineer proposed a project that would:
... bring together the necessary compon-
ents of employment, shelter and the com-
munity action-linked by communication and
utility service systems.18
A target population of households with a monthly
income of less than K Shs 500 was defined, and
the goals of this project were specified as
follows:
(a) to provide access to land and
security of tenure on a long term
basis (10,000 plots) primarily for
residential use, with supporting
community facilities including
schools and clinics,
(b) to control speculation and
profit-making at the expense of the
low-income sector,
(c) to stimulate employment opportunity
and industrial activities in the
organization of local residents
associations as for credit,
purchasing, equipment, training of
special skills, management, legal
assistance and marketing outlets,
(d) to provide a framework within which
residents can develop their own
lots by promoting the organization
of local resident associations to
administer the development of
housing units and utility networks,
(e) to provide communications and
utilities channels which will
stimulate transportation routes, and
investment in residential, industrial
and commercial activities, both
within and near new communities.1 9
To achieve these goals, the following program
was proposed:
(a) acquisition and preparation of
10,000 lots to serve as sites for
20,000 rooms (10,000 housing units
of two rooms each), to accommodate
an estimated two-income population
of at least 60,000,
(b) formation of a financial institution
specializing in loans, for materials
and equipment, to the builder-leasee
providing incremental's investment
housing on these lots. This
institution could also construct
some of the dwelling units itself
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and rent them to qualified occupiers
and,
(c) provision of manufacturing facilities -
both plant and equipment in case of the
larger facilities.20
A set of institutional arrangements were
suggested for the housing component of the
project:
(a) All services other than those pertaining
to the preparation of the plots twill be
provided by the NCC as part of its
regular responsibilities and will not be
charged to the project. This means that
the costs of health facilities,
circumferential roads (other than those
needed for the direct implementation of
the project), educational and social
facilities will be borne by the NCC
budget and only partly covered by
charges and taxes paid by the
inhabitants of the 10,000 plots,
(b) the built form, while circumscribed by
the nature of materials and equipment
provided, will be left to the discretion
of the builder-leasee, subject to
regulations pertaining to safety and
sanitation. Design and production
assistance will be necessary to ensure
sound investment by the individual,
(c) The financial institution will be a
quasi-private body with powers of
eviction, transfer of title, loan
moratoria and renewal. The financial
institution will procure building
materials equipment necessary to
construct the houding unit. It will
then make loans -in kind in the form of
materials and possibly equipment (at an
interest calculated to cover its admin-
istrative expenses) to the builder-
leasee. These loans will be repaid over
a period of up to 25 years. The
financial institution will also act as
agent for the NCC for purposes of
collecting the plot rent. This wilt
facilitate payment by the builder-
leasee and reduction of administrative
expenses,
(d) The tied loans will be granted in
amounts sufficient to enable the con-
struction of a two room dwelling on the
plot. The bluilder-leasee will construct
the housing unit, perhaps in cooperation
with other such individual's local
resident associations. At least one of
the rooms built will be occupied by the
builder-leasee, while one of the rooms
could be rented to another qualified
occupant. The responsibilities for
payment of the loan and for payment for
water, sewerage and refuse disposal and
other chargeable services will rest with
the builder-leasee.2 1
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The City Engineer's Department, in collaboration
with the other previously mentioned partici-
pants, completed the report, entitlet Interim
Urbanization Projects: A Preliminary Proposal,
(JUP) in February 1972. Despite considerable
resistance along the way to the idea of a large
concentration of low-income dwellers, the IUP
proposal was adopted by the Ministry of Local
Government for onward transmission in late-1972
to the IBRD in Washington, D.C. The IUP pro-
posal was approved by the IBRD which then gave
the go-ahead to the NCC for the preparation of a
detailed project feasibility study.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIIOBI- MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY TEAM'S
PIOPOSAL
Meanwhile a rather significant event related to
the DCDP occurred outside the NCC in mid-1972.
From June through August an academic exchange
program took place in Nairobi involving graduate
students and faculty from the Department of
Architecture at the University of Nairobi (U of
N), and the Urban Settlement Design Program at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(M.I.T.) The focus of the exchange program was
low-cost shelter workshop in Nairobi, and the
work included extensive studies of low-income
dwelling environments and the preparation of a
schematic proposal for a large low-cost shelter
project. Members of the exchange program were
aware of the NCC' s efforts and intentions at the
time, and liaised closely with personnel in the
City Engineer's Department. Out of this
interaction came the U of N - M.I.T. team's
decision to select the site that was eventually
chosen to be the actual location for the DCDP as
the one for their academic endeavors.
The U of N - M.I.T. team was led by the eminent
John Turner and the dynamic Horacio Caminos. At
the time, both were leading advocates of
self-help shelter programs and had acted as
consultants to the IBRD. Their previous efforts
had focussed mainly on Latin America.
The final design of the DCDP is remarkable for
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both its similarities to, and its differences
from the earlier preliminary proposal prepared
by the U of N - M.I.T. team.2 2 The similarities
lie in the overall site structure plan,
especially the central spine concept, while the
dwelling layouts bear almost no resemblance.
Presented below are the important and distinc-
tive features of lthe U of N - M.I.T. team's
proposal.
To begin with, the project was envisaged not as
one single consolidated development, but as a
multi-phased developnent which integrated both
public and private sector programs. The
financing for the initial development was to
come from public as well as private sources.
Initial development was located in the area of
the site that had the most direct access from
existing roads, convenient pedestrian access to
public transportation, and which allowed the
utilization of existing infrastructure and
services-commrcial areas, industries, schools
and so on - of adjacent communities. The site
layout was structured such that it allowed for a
natural progressive by accretion of the
different land uses, circulation and
infrastructure. This made for compact rather
than scattered development, and at any stage a
balance was maintanined between the different
land uses and the developnent of the circulation
system.
The land use plan allocated the project site
area in the following proportions: 10 percent
for circulation; 10 percent for commercial
activities; 45 percent for residential luse; and
the remaining 35 percent for social facilities
and amenities such as schools, playgrounds,
religious centers, community centers, recreation
areas and a hospital. The commercial and major
community facilities were located in a central
spine running along the length of site with
residential areas abutting both sides of the
spine. A hierarchical circulation network
established a primary ordering whole development.
The residential area was subdivided into blocks,
lots and clusters. Gross densities of between
200 and 400 persons per hectare were planned
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for. Within the concept of blocks, lots and
units, five different types of housing was
provided: (1) individually serviced lots;
(2) core shell dwelling units; (3) tenements
with communal services; (4) commercial
facilities with integrated residential units;
and (5) clusters of seriviced lots. Tenure
options were predominantly rental and long term
leases. Subletting of rooms was anticipated in
all the various housing types. When fully
developed, the authors of this proposal
estimated a saturation population of 120,000
inhabitants.
All along, the NCC was kept informed of the
academic group's work and formal presentations
were made to NCC officials concerned with
housing.
PROJECT PREPARATIM
Project preparation began in earnest in January
1973. In response to an IBRD request the NCC
formed a Housing Task Force (HTF) to undertake
the work. With technical personnel seconded
from other NCC sections, the HTF had an
expatriate director for the first six-months of
its duration. This arrangement proved
unsatisfactory; Senior Officers in the NCC,
both expatriate and local, were upset at the
abrupt arrival of a project leader with limited
knowledge of the project context. The senior
officers felt that they possessed the
appropriate level of expertise and relevant
experience to do a good job on their own.
Resentment set in; the Technical Director was
ineffective, and little progress was made during
his short stay.
While the director's departure solved the
immediate problem, it also meant that the HTF
was without an overall leader. This problem
by the fact that all the technical personnel in
the HTF worked on the project on a part-time
basis, on top of their routine departmental
tasks and participation in the on-going Nairobi
Urban Study. The lack of sufficient numbers of
qualified staff was a problem shared by the
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While the director's departure solved the
immediate problen, it also meant that the HTF
was without an overall leader. This problem
by the fact that all the technical personnel in
the HTF worked on the project on a part-time
basis, on top of their routine departmental
tasks and participation in the on-going Nairobi
Urban Study. The lack of sufficient numbers of
qualified staff was a problem shared by the
whole of the NCC. Amidst all these not
altogether unfamiliar difficulties the HTF made
slow progress. Within the HTF various sub-
groups were formed to tackle the substantive
areas of the proposed project: physical design;
lot allocation procedures; administration of
materials and lot loans; control of legal lot
occupation; and the design of the organization
which would implement the project. In preparing
the proposal the HTF faced the dilemma of
satisfying the IBRD's project specifications
without giving local politicians undue cause to
raise serious objections. While the World
Bank's policies emphasized poverty alleviation
measures, Kenyan authorities were concerned
whole of the NCC. Amidst all these not
altogether unfamiliar difficulties the HTF made
about preserving Nairobi's image as a modern
international metropolis. The ruling elite had
expressed concern over the deliberate creation
of urban eysores and criticized standards
which were perceived as a carryover from the
colonial days and which were not in accordance
with African dignity. Walking this kind of
tightrope was to become part of the regular
activity for those involved in the project on a
day-to-day basis.
DISPUTE OVER APPIOPRIATE STANDARDS: ACT CWE
Debates, controversies, conflicts, delays, and
increased costs had plagued both the Kariobangi
and Mathare schemes. The DCDP was to be no
exception; the whole issue of the appropriate-
ness of planning and design standards versus
increased implementation costs and affordability
has significantly hindered the progress of the
DCDP throughout its duration. Beardmore (1978)
has described the conflict within the NCC over
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the issue of standard of infrastructure as one
of the most crucial issues of Dandora.24 The
Dandora episode of this endless saga first began
during the writing of the Draft Project Report
in later part of 1973 and the first half of
1974. At this time, two major issues involving
standards emerged. one concerned the extent to
which the DCDP should cater for private
automobile ownership. The other involved the
preferred waterbourne sewerage system with
individual connections to each plot at costs
affordable to the target income group. These
two issues were of concern to two different
interest groups. The motivations of these two
groups were illustrative of this type of
situation, and indicative of the basis on which
battle lines tended to be drawn.
The problem of waterborne sewage was of concern
primarily to the technical specialists. The
warring camps consisted of the engineers in the
NCC's Housing Task Force who were designing the
system and those in the NCC's Water and Sewage
Department who would have to operate it. At a
much later stage the Municipal Medical Officer
of Health joined this fray. The main bone of
contention was: how much could the design of
the system deviate from standard NCC practice in
an effort to save money without creating
additional maintenance problems? A tradeoff had
to be made between lower developnent costs and
higher maintenance costs.
The HTF designers, for the sake of economy, had
grouped together the four wet-cores for each two
pairs of back-to-back lots. The designers
proposed locating main sewers in way-leaves on
private property. This solution resulted in
significant cost savings, K Shs 1700 (US $204)
per lot, as compared to the conventional layout
which positioned mains under the streets and
used long branches to make separate individual
connections. A similar solution was proposed
for the water supply system, and this resulted
in savings of K Shs 320 (US $39) per lot. The
disadvantage with the cost saving proposal was
that the short branch mains passed under the
units which had concrete floor slabs. This
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meant that repairwork in the future could
potentially be messy, more time-consuming and
costly. The Water and Sewage Department also
argued that the proposed sewerage layout
resulted in manholes and inspection chambers
being located deep inside private property, and
that this did not facilitate convenient
maintenance of the system. The then Town Clerk,
a strong supporter of the DCDP, intervened to
break this deadlock by favoring the HTF
proposal. The 'Town Clerk's intervention was
necessitated by the need to complete the Draft
Report on schedule for onward transmission and
eventual submission to the World Bank. However,
this was only the ending of the first act of
what was to be a much longer drama.
The problem of accommodating automobiles in
Dandora, was, as Beardmore (1978) suggests, of
interest to a broader constituency.2 5
Automobiles in Kenya are very expensive items,
and the private car is thus a prized possession
and a prestigious status symbol, apart from
being a very convenient and comfortable means of
transportation in a city where public means of
transportation generally leave a lot to be
desired. Cars were symbols of modernity and
such symbols have considerable social and
political value in Kenya. Councillors argued
that every plot holder would aspire to
automobile ownership and that each should be
directly accessible by car and large enough to
allow for on-site parking. The technicians who
argued against adopting this standard built
their case on the statistical data compiled by
the NUSG which indicated that the probability of
a household in the target income owning a car
was very low, about 3.6 percent. While all data
in Nairobi's context should be treated with
caution, and questioned on the basis of common
sense and experience, it should be noted that
transportation was an area of emphasis in the
Nairobi Urban Study. Using the NUSG figure of
3.6 percent, and assuming three families per
lot, a maximum of 110 cars per 1000 lots is
indicated. The councillors were calling for a
project layout which could accommodate nine times
this maximum number. However, it was difficult
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to argue, on purely technical grounds, against
the notion of rising expectations amongst
Nairobi's low-income groups, and the principle
of one car per lot was finally accepted.
PIRJECT DETAILS AND IMPLM ICN
Nonetheless, a Draft Project Report was
completed by October 1973 and submitted to the
IBRD for discussion. The development concept
for the project was based on site-and-services
priciple, and a specific site had been selected
from amongst those proposed in the IUP proposal
site selection criteria had included the
availability of a large parcel of vacant land
and reasonable proximity to both exfsting and
planned employment opportunities for the
project's intended low-income beneficiaries.
The site selected was located in Dandora, some
eleven kilometers north-east of the Nairobi
city-center.
A structure plan which defined the size and
location of land uses was presented. The site's
elongated shape suggested a central spine
containing commercial, industrial and
institutional uses, to which residential
neighborhood units were attached.
Conventional physical planning attitudes such
as segregation of land uses were singularly
evident; and this may have been done
deliberately to minimize opposition. In other
respects however, the projects's physical design
represented a significant departure from
previous practice. The phasing program allowed
for progressive growth and development whereby
infrastructure and public facilities were
constructed as and when the need arose, thereby
reducing the opportunity cost of premature
investment. Lot layouts, sizes and dimensions
attempted to use land more efficiently, and
minimize the cost of services by reducing the
length of sewer, water-supply and road networks.
Infrastructure standards were also lower than
usual. Controversy erupted over this particular
issue and the project's designers became
embroiled in a prolonged and costly dispute with
regulators and other officials. This dispute is
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described in greater detail below. The Draft
Report also contained proposals for lot alloca-
tion procedures, loan management, legal occupa-
tion controls and community developnent
functions. Based on the overall scheme at this
stage of development, a preliminary financial
plan was drawn up.
Beardmore (1978) suggests that by this time, the
goals and objectives of the DCDP had begun to
shift in a number of subtle and significant
ways. His comments include the following:
The project had started the slow but
perceptible process of conversion from
a comprehensive community development
project to a peri-urban housing
estate. This shift can be explained
in part by the physical planning bias
of the Housing Task Force which caused
their terms of reference to be
expressed in terms of the provision of
shelter, not jobs. The ambiguity
surrounding the goals of the Task
Force is illustrated by the fact that
it was sometimes called an
Urbanization Task Force.
Notwithstanding this confusion, it was
evident that the housing objective was
beginning to dominate the urbanization
objective of the project.2 6
The Draft Report was imcomplete in two major
areas. A detailed site-layout has been
precluded as a result of the dispute
over infrastructure standards, namely car-
parking and sewers. In addition, the HTF and
NCC had been unable to agree upon the organiza-
tional structure for an implenting agency. The
IBRD waited until March 1974 and then, out of
sheer frustration, threatened to cancel the
whole venture if there was any further delay.
While the IBRD was carrying out its final pro-
ject appraisal, the NCC approved the overall
content of the DCDP and the specific layout for
Phase one. The project area was designated as
an urban zone governed by the Grade II Building
27By-laws which permitted standards of construc-
tion lower than under Grade I By-laws which
govern most of Nairobi. Cn May 6, 1975 loan and
credit agreements were signed by representatives
from the IBRD, the International Development
Association (IDA), the Government of Kenya, and
the NCC. A staggering forty-nine months had
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lapsed since the IBRD had first indicated its
interest in financing an urbanization project in
Nairobi in March 1971. Since then the lead time
for the second and third generation of World
Bank-sponsored urban projects has been substan-
tially reduced. It must be said that while the
NCC was none too-swift in its deliberations, the
IBRD was also breaking new ground with its
lending policies for urban projects, and, as
previously noted, had consciously adopted an
approach of learning -by-doing . As a result the
project cycle was slower than usual. The major
components of the DCDP, as per the 1975 plan
included:
- Serviced Lots:
The project was to provide 6000 lots in four
different sizes (100m2 , 120m2 , 140m 2 and 160m 2)
with three alternative services options
(discussed in detail later). Upon construction
of an approved dwelling allottees would be
entitled to a fifty-year lease. The site layout
allowed for an estimated density of 320 persons
per hectare spread out over thirty-two lots per
hectare. This density was not a typical of
lapsed since the IBRD had first indicated its
interest in financing an urbanization project in
Nairobi in March 1971. Since then the lead time
Nairobi's more densely populated planned public
housing areas. Vehicular access to each lot
resulted in twenty-three percent of the total
acreage in Phase Che being devoted to roads.
- Materials Loans:
Estimated to be sufficient for the procurement
of materials for the construction of one or
two rooms depending on the lot option, the
loans were to be lent at an 8.5 percent
interest rate. Repayment would be spread out
over twenty to thirty years with a five-year
grace period in the case of lots with a
minimal level of contractor-built services. A
flexible computerized system would greatly
facilitate accounting.
- Community Facilities:
A variety of community facilities and
ammenities were planned for including:
religious centers; health clinics; comunity
centers; primary and secondary schools;
neighborhood shopping areas and a major
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shopping center; markets; post office; police
station; fire station; parks and open-spaces;
and a sports center.
- Monitoring
A comprehensive multidisciplinary monitoring
and evaluation study was to be carried out on
a continuous basis as soon as project
implementation commenced.
By June of 1974 the project preparation had
been wrapped up. The IBRD was satisfied with
the final site plan and the establishment of a
project implementation unit was under way. As
a result of its leverage on the DCDP the IBRD
was also able to negotiate a longer-term
program to address the institutional def-
iciencies and shortcomings which existed
within government bodies responsible for
public sector shelter provision. This program
included: a review of municipal finance in
Kenya; improvement of the NCC's organizational
ability to implement an effective housing
program; a study of squatter upgrading with an
eventual city-wide proposal for Nairobi.
To implement the DCDP, the NCC established the
Dandora Project Department (DPD) in May 1975,
and on-site construction work began in October
of the same year. (The DPD is discussed in
more detail later.) A last minute design
change was made in the wet-core units. More
costly, prefabricated concrete wall panels
were to be used instead of the traditional
concrete block wall construction. It turned
out that Phase One was only one-third the size
required to justify the cost of setting up the
site factory used to produce these panels.28
Various unexpected technical problems also
dogged the fabrication and installation of
this relatively untried system.
Menezes and Partners, a local architecture and
planning firm which had developed a sound
reputation in the field of housing, were
appointed overall consultants for the
implementation of the DCDP. The firm's founder,
Braz Menezes, was destined to leave the firm in
the late-1970's to join the staff of the IBRD's
Urban Projects Department. In the mid-1970's
the firm became Mutiso-Menezes International
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due to the arrival of a new partner, David
Mutiso, a noteworthy individual in Kenya's
architecture profession. Mutiso was Kenya's
first qualified African architect who had also
been the first African to occupy the position of
Chief Architect in the Ministry of Works, a
position he held for about a decade before
entering private practice. Mutiso-Menezes
International grew rapidly to become the largest
such firm in Kenya with a cadre of international
staff drawn from associated firms in Britain,
Denmark and Canada.
LOTr ALIDCATICN
The lot allocation process began in March 1976
with the approval by the Dandora Steering
Committee of the application forms designed by
the DPD's Community Development Section.
Information which applicants were required to
furnish in these forms included: personal
details; preference of lot type; compliance with
various selection criteria and any relevant
supporting evidence; prior participation in any
community organization; and knowledge of
building construction. These forms were then
of fered for sale to the public at K Shs 20 each.
There is some evidence to suggest that, ini-
tially at least, the project was not adequately
advertised, and sales of the application forms
were low. 2 9 An advertising campaign, primarily
in the mass printed media, was launched to
publicise the DCDP. However, Soni (1980) in his
interviews with some of the occupants of Phase
(he of the DCDP learned that many allottees had
come to know about the project either through
sheer accident, or had obtained the information
second- or third-hand. Those who lacked formal
education could not comprehend the written
advertisements. Many allottees did not get a
clear idea of the project and its aims until
they made further detailed inquiries at City
Hall. Even then, most of them apparently did
not get the correct picture about the plots and
dwellings. Not all the allottees understood the
meaning of self-help, their own role in the
construction of the dwellings, and the various
forms and limits of assistance provided by the
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DPD. 3 1
By the time applications closed on June 30,
1976, from the total of 20,948 forms which had
been sold, 16,018 were completed and returned
to the DPD. The next two months, July and
August, were spent on processing the
applications. Students from the University of
Nairobi were hired on a temporary basis to
assist the staff of the DPD's Community
Developnent Section in interviewing prospective
applicants in order to verify the information
contained in the submitted applications. In
order to be eligible for selection, applicants
had to meet all of the following criteria:
(a) The total income at the time of
application of the tenant and such
members of his family as will live with
him on his plot was between K Shs 280
and K Shs 500 per month for Option A
plots and K Shs 450 and K Shs 650 per
month for Option B plots.
(b) The prospective tenant had lived in
Nairobi for at least two years
immediately prior to his application for
a plot and did not own any residential
property in Nairobi.
(c) The tenant's family (spouse, if any, or
children) did at the time of
application, and would, upon allocation
of a plot, reside with the tenant.
(d) Prospective tenants would pay NCC the
appropriate fees for sewerage and water
connection and a deposit of K She 400
within sixty days of notification that
they have been allocated a plot.3 2
Applications were disqualified if they were
incomplete, illegible, duplicates of earlier
submissions, not accompanied by supporting
documents showing proof of income, or not
submitted on the official forms. Thus, of the
16,018 applications which were submitted, only
9,308 finally qualified to bid for the 6,000
plots.
The actual allocation procedure stirred up
controversy. A computer-based random selection
system was used. The NCC offered some
resistance to this idea at first, but the weight
of overwhelming logic prevailed. Councillors
resisted this procedure probably because, as
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Beardmore (1978) suggests: "The more common
manual systems of balloting were easier to
tamper with."3 3  Problems over the allocation of
lots had occurred previously with the both
Kariobaugi and Mathare schemes. In both these
instances, councillors had been anxious to
determine who would get lots. 3 4
The process of selecting applicants for
sites-and-services project presents some
administrative problems. Selection criteria
must be carefully considered and be consistent
with the policy goals and program objectives.
Time pressure and resource constraints (both
financial and manpower) dictate that for
verification purposes, the selection criteria be
limited to a few key items. Matters are further
complicated by the fact that amongst the urban
poor there are many who, for one reason or
another, do not prossess the required documents.
Interviewing each applicant, or a random sample,
appears to be the most reliable method for
screening applicants at present.
C September 24, 1976, the computerized
balloting system was used to allocate 5,670
plots. The successful applicants were selected
at random from the lists for plot Options A and
B. Formal offers in writing were made to the
successful applicants were placed in random
order on a waiting-list. The successful appli-
cants were given six weeks to accept the offer
and make a down payment of K Shs 400 (US $48)
together with a water connection fee of K Shs
150 (US $18). To familiarize allottees with the
nature and requirements of the project, the
DPD's Community Developnent Section held orien-
tation meetings during this six week period.
All but fifty-five allottees accepted the offer
of a serviced lot in the DCDP. Lots which were
not accepted were re-offered to applicants whose
names were on the waiting-list. Each allottee
was provided with keys for the wet core, and a
set of house type design drawings and specifica-
tions which were intended to provide guidelines
and information for dwelling construction.
Allottees were also required to sign a lease
agreement which included a variety of
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stipulations: Dwellings were to be built to
minimum standards, as specified by the DPD,
within eighteen months of signing the lease.
Entire dwellings could not be sublet and allot-
tees were required to inform the DPD of the
identities of their tenants. Lots could not be
transferred to other private parties for the
first five years of the lease. Within this time
lots could, however, be handed back to DPD which
would compensate the allottee for all improve-
ments.
DISPUTE OVER APPRDPRIATE STANDARDS:
ACT TWO:
In May 1976, eight months after the construction
of Phase Cne had commenced, the DPD received
negative comments from the NCC about the DCDP's
overall planning and infrastructural layout.
The Medical Officer of Health, in a memo to the
Town Clerk, listed fifteen items of planning
and design which he claimed did not comply with
normally accepted standards of practice, the
requirements of the Public Health Act, or the
Grade II Building By-Laws. Acknowleding that it
was too late to do anything at this point about
Phase Qie, his list of criticisms included the
following:
2. The layout of the whole scheme lacks
essential amenities and is bad in priciple. For
example, no open spaces or recreation gardens
are provided for and the whole area will be a
mass of buildings reminiscent of overcrowded
camps. The only open spaces provided for are
mainly secondary murram roads, which are
themselves a danger to health because of dust
from speeding motor vehicles....
3. Dwellings, latrines, baths and kitchens are
planned on a back to back fashion, making it
impossible for efficient through or cross
ventilation (contrary to By-law 14 of Grade II
by-laws of the Building Code). If the purpose
of this scheme is to substitute for slums and
shanties, thus improving peoples' health, the
scheme as constructed or envisaged will defeat
that purpose. Such a compact mass of buildings
with hardly any space for circulation of air and
back to back dwellings will be the source of air
borne, infectious diseases. Vermin infestations
will easily spread to whole blocks from a focus
and will be very difficult to deal with [his
emphasis]....
6. The general principle of providing means of
inspection at all points of change of direction,
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junctions and change of levels of drainage is
not complied with Rule 35 of the Public Health
(Drainage and Latrine Rules) [sic].....
13. There is no indication of water storage
facilities for other purposes. The water supply
will be totally inadequate for showers, kichens,
washing of clothes, etc. Should water pressure
go faulty, the whole village will be denied of
water supply. This will lead to indiscriminate
defecation in the yards, and dysentries, typhoid
and fly nuisance will be the order of the
day."35
The Medical Officer of Health was of the opinion
that the dwellings were unsuitable and unfit,
and would encourage air-borne, insect-borne
diarrhea and otherenteric diseases, social
stress diseases.36 Apart form being dangerous
to the health of residents, he felt that the
scheme was generally unsuitable for the city; it
was viewed as a potential breeding ground for
crime and other public vices. In this last
respect he was beginning to sound suspiciously
like some of his colonial predecessors.
This debate on standards delayed the formal
approval of Phase Cne by the NCC. As a result,
even though allottees had been given possession
of their plots, the DPD could not issue the
standard house plans which the allottees were
required to use in constructing their dwellings.
The DPD could also not go ahead with building
demonstration houses on seventeen lots as had
been planned. These demonstration houses were
delayed for so long that they were never built
at all. After about six months of discussion,
on January 20, 1977, the plans for Phase Che
were reluctantly approved on the grounds that it
was too late to make the called-for changes.
Meanwhile, since November 1976, allottees had
only been allowed to construct temporary
dwellings. By March 1977 nearly two hundred
Option A plots with the minimum wet-core had
been occuppied and allottees had constructed
make-shift shelters. These shelters were used
variously to accomodate the plot's occupants
together with their personal possessions, and to
store some of the more valuable building
materials. Many members of the Council were
alarmed by proliferation of these hastily and
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cheaply built shelters which were reminiscent of
those found in Nairobi's squatter settlements.
They feared that Dandora was turning into a
planned slum. A fresh controversy erupted as
plot holders were ordered to demolish all such
illegal structures by the end of March 1977.
This latest wave of resistance had been
triggered by the dramatic resignation of, first,
the Mayor who is the daughter of President
Kenyatta, and then, the 'Ibwn Clerk, a competent
administrator and one of the DCDP's staunchest
supporters. These two important resignations
were an indication of things to come. During
1977, political intervention in the DCDP
increased, and this state of affairs, amongst
other things, resulted in the resignation of
five of the DPD's senior personnel who all left
between December 1977 and April 1978. The
positions which were vacated were: Project
Manager; Deputy Project Manager; the Project
Architect Planner; the Project Architect; and
the Head of the Community Development Section.
This meant that as the implementation of Phase
Two drew closer, the DPD had lost most of its
experienced leadership. In the debate over
appropriate infrastructure standards the
position taken by the DPD was later described as
follows:
The plans for Phase 1 were prepared in
accordance with the Grade II By-laws
requirements and in some cases, eg. the
provision for the sewerage was given at a
higher level than stipulated since it was
based upon a water-borne system rather
than pit-latrines.3 8
Plans for Phase Two had been drawn by using the
same planning and design standards as Phase one.
When these plans were submitted to the NCC for
approval they were rejected. The comments on
the submission called for about eleven major
changes to be incorporated in a revised scheme.
It was estimated that to accomodate these
changes would cost an additional K Shs
1.38 million. 3 9 This amounted to some K Shs
520 (US $662) per lot. The Monitoring and
Evaluation Study Report (MEDIS Che) of April
1977 made the following recommendation:
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Since the Dandora Project is designated
a Grade II By-law zone, and standards
employed exceed Grade II By-law stan-
dards, and further, since there appear
to be no health or technical problems
with design, work on Phase II outht to
recommence immediately. Attempting to
renegotiate loan agreements with
IDA/IBRD and to redesign Phase II
infrastructure, layout and house plans,
as proposed.... can only lead to
further delays of unforeseeable
duration.40
Four months of discussion ensued before a
compromise solution was agreed upon in April
1977. The negotiation and bargaining had
involved NCC officers DPD technicians,
councillors, officials from the central
government, and representatives from the World
Bank. Location of the sewer mains was changed
to provide for a three meter wayleave between
back-to-back lots. This necessitated
modification of the wet-core from a single
four-unit module to two two-unit modules, and
resulted in an estimated K Shs 190,000 (US
$456,000) in additional construction costs and
design fees.41 These additional costs, however,
were not to be recoverable from the lot
owners.
4 2
Finally, the amended plans for Phase Two were
approved by the NCC, and construction of
the on-site services began in April 1978. The
debate over standards had caused a delay of
about a year in the construction stage resulting
in increased costs due to inflation and price
escalation. Lot allottees were also adversely
affected since they could not occupy their lots
as initially anticipated.
It was originally planned that water mains would
also pass through the wayleave. However, this
ran into problems at a later date. According to
the Monitoring and Evaluation Study Report
(MEDIS Five) of March 1979, the NCC's Water and
Sewage Department claimed that the wayleave
was too narrow to accomodate both sewer and
water mains. In addition, it was claimed that
placing water and sewer mains together presented
a health hazard in the event of leaks and
possible contamination of the water supply.
Eventually it was agreed to locate water mains
on the street side of lots. Bringing water
pipes through the length of the lots to the wet
cores entailed extra costs which were to be
borne by the allottees in increased lot charges.
Similar problems and delays were experienced in
the design and implementation of the related
community facilities such as a primary school, a
health center, a market and shops. In all
instances the NCC was loathe to adopt design
standards lower than those which had been used
previously for similar facilities located
elsewhere in the city.
Persistence and persuasion do appear to have
yeilded positive results ultimately. Even if
these results have differed somewhat from the
original intention, they nonethless represent
substantial progress. The following excerpt,
based on a World Bank appraisal of the DCDP,
strikes a note of cautious optimism with
reference to official attitudes towards efforts
to achieve greater economy:
While officials bave often maintained
a rigid position regarding standards,
some have gradually come to recognize
the benefits of flexibility. In Kenya
I the Nairobi City Council (NCC) even-
tually agreed to accept a low-cost
primary school specially designed for
the project. Because local acceptance
was so widespread, NCC has now adopted
the design as its standard prototype
for primary schools throughout the
city.4 3
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ORIENTATICIm TMARDS CANGE
This chapter focuses on the issue of change
in the planning and implementation process.
More specifically, it examines various types of
strategies which may be employed to achieve a
variety of change-oriented goals. The analyti-
cal framework used in this chapter to probe the
site-and-services experience in Nairobi, is
drawn largely from the work of Zaltman and
Duncan (1977)1 which represents a consolidation
of a whole body of earlier work in the area of
social change and technical innovation.
The discussion is premised upon the normative
assumption that a change-oriented process is
more effective in Third World cities than one
which is not; that such a process will be better
able to respond to the special, and perhaps uni-
que, set of circumstances and characteristics of
each planning context, and therefore, a change-
oriented planning and implementation process
will have a better chance of arriving at a suc-
cessful outcome. Underlying this line of
reasoning is the belief in the concept of stra-
tegic flexibility whereby resources are deployed
in a manner which allows output to be maintained
in the face of changing circumstances. A
change-oriented process is viewed as being par-
ticularly appropriate to the rapidly growing,
politically turbulent, resource-constrained
cities of the Third World. Some of the
distinguishing features of change-oriented
planning and implementation processes are
outlined below.
C(e of the hallmarks of a change-oriented
process is an effective learning mechanism.
Indeed, this aspect of the process may be the
most important one in the long-term. A learning
mechanism is necessitated by the fact that very
often planners and decision-makers are faced
with situations where: there is a lack of suf-
ficient and reliable data; the present state of
knowledge and the state-of-the-art are limited
and inadequate; prior experience is non-
existent, or inappropriate, or sometimes a
decided handicap; the unanticipated often
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occurs; and there is a pressing need to experi-
ment and innovate. Learning mechanisms and the
various implications and consequences thereof,
have been explored at length by various authors,
prominent among them being: Argyris and Schon
(1978); Friedman (1973); and Schon (1971).2
Apart from pointing out the need for much mecha-
nisms, these authors dwell on ways and means
(variously in organizational, individual, social
and technical realms) of sensing, collecting and
processing data, utilising information to shape
or influence action, monitoring the results and
so on into the feedback loop.
Income redistribution measures, or in other
words, targetting of public resources to achieve
the maximum effect in the service of poverty
alleviation, is seen by many as an esential item
in the agenda of change-oriented planning
efforts in the Third World. As Tym (1980)
suggests:
The mere definition of a target group
may well itself spell a divergence
from current policies which may not be
specific to groups, at least defined
in this way. Such a definition pre-
supposes that the projects that are to
be provided will be for a specific
sector of the population and that
their incomes and the extent that they
could contribute towards the cost of
the project should be a determinant of
the project itself.3
The hardships faced by the urban poor are
atttibuted, in part, to the lack of sufficient
access to urban facilities and services. Tym
suggests that any attempt to lessen the
hardships suffered by the urban poor must
grapple with the inefficiencies and inequities in
the financial mechanisms for providing urban
facilities and services.4 Precisely such a
scheme is presented by Linn (1979) in a World
Bank Staff Working Paper.5 While this paper
concentrates on issues of economic policy for
urban growth and developnent, it treats the
areas of public investment, pricing, taxation
and regulation as instruments for influencing
the shape of the urban form. Particular atten-
tion is paid to the configuration of transpor-
tation networks, pattern of land uses,
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distribution of services, and the character of
housing developnent.
Based on a political perspective of events in
the Third World, planners are criticized for
inadvertently serving the status quo. 'IT quote
Stamp (1980):
the aims of... planners... can be eclipsed
by the decisions of Third World leaders....
The problem is exacerbated by the language
used by the planners and its failure to deal
with the analysis and treatment of political
and economic realities...neutral language can
be coopted by government bureaucrats and used
as a political tool. Often plans are for-
mulated with little intention of
implementation.6
An increasingly important planning consideration
in Third World urban contenxts is cost recovery.
The public sector's general inability to
generate sufficient funds through the overall
public revenue system means that effective cost
recovery mechanisms provide one of the few
alternative ways of being able to finance large
scale urban developnent projects on a recurring
basis. Given the ever increasing demand for
basic urban facilities and service, wholesale
subsidization is simply beyond possibility.
Cross-subsidization, however may be feasible in
limited instances.
Recent planning efforts have also attempted to
break up large-scale projects into smaller,
discrete pieces. The resulting flexibility is
advantageous in several ways:
- implementation may be conveniently
phased;
- the amount of capital tied up in a
project at any one time is reduced,
thereby decreasing carrying costs;
- the experience from earlier stages of
the project may be used to improve the
design successive stages;
- major changes may be made to individual
pieces without necessarily altering
or jeopardizing the whole;
- implementation efforts and the deployment
of scarce resources may be better
synchronized.
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From the preceeding discussion it is evident
that in attempting to implement change, various
forms of resistance may well be encountered. As
long as any party (individual or group) has the
perception that the proposed change is not to
its best interest(s), then there is the poten-
tial for resistance from that quarter. Given
that such opponents have the means to actively
resist in some form, this potential will be
manifested at the first opportune moment.
Proponents of change must therefore strive to
anticipate such resistance, and be prepared to
handle the consequences, or attempt to preempt
such action.
Possible grounds for resistance are many and
varied: cultural; social; economic; political;
psychological; organizational; ecological, to
name a few of the more common ones. 7 However,
efforts to achieve change may not only be
thwarted by active opposition to the proposals.
Resistance may result from the sheer inability
to participate in the change action on the part
of the target or client population. In such
cases, assuming the presence of an initial
willingness to participate, the planner's task
will be to provide the target population with
the minimum capacity necessary to take advantage
of the planned change.
Within the framework of an overall planning and
implementation process various types of strate-
gies may be employed for the purposes of
achieving a variety of change-oriented goals and
objectives. This chapter presents a typology of
strategies for planned change and uses it as a
framework for discussing and analzing the
various discernable strategies employed during
the course of the site-and-services experience
in Nairobi. Each instance drawn from this
experience has been selected on the basis of its
perceived potential for bringing about, or
influencing, planned change. In some instances
this potential has been fully or partially
realized, while in other instances a direct
impact has not been evident from the emerging
pattern of events. Some strategies have suc-
ceeded and others have not.
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The typology is as follows:
- facilitative strategies;
- reeducative strategies;
- persuasive strategies;
- power strategies.
The criteria used to differentiate between the
numerous strategies included the following:
- degree of control over ultimate outcome;
- technique utilized;
- operating time-frame;
- degree and type of planned change;
- nature and extent of resistance to proposed
change.
Following this discussion of strategies for
planned change, the last two sections of this
chapter are commentaries on two related aspects:
prevailing attitudes amongst officials concerned
with public housing; and the role of expatriates
in the formulation of housing policies and
programs.
FACILITATIVE STRATEGIES
Facilitative strategies are those strategies
which provide external assistance to increase
the capacity and capability of the client to
carry out planned change. Assistance may be
provided in any form deemed beneficial for any
aspect of the planning and implementation
process. The site-and services concept is
itself, by definition, an example of a
facilitative strategy. By furnishing allottees
with demarcated lots and varying packages of
services, loans and technical assistance, the
public sector facilitates the building of
dwellings by the private sector.
Resource-constrained situations demand
faciltative strategies which allow public
resources to be used to maximum advantage in
priority areas and which thereby stimulate the
mobilization of private resources. More
generally, there are those who argue that the
basic rationale behind the planning of the
physical environment is to facilitate economic
growth and development while balancing it with
social concerns. 1 0
Safier (1972) advocates the following approach
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towards urban planning in the Third Wbrld
context:
The whole weight of progressive professional
work today lies in the direction of mini-
mizing the magnitude of resources required to
provide for a growing urban population
without the wealth to provide for itself or
add to existing scarce funds and skills.
Arguably, if this type of approach is to be
widely adopted and sustained on a long-term
degree of socio-political disruption, then
facilitative strategies will be important
instruments for change.
An example of a facilitative strategy is the
United Nations -sponsored Bloomberg-Abrams
mission to Kenya in 1964. This mission, and the
subsequent report, were significant in a number
of ways. In the first instance, the very act of
calling in two eminent experts in the field of
housing indicated, on the part of the Kenyan
Government, an awareness of the problem and an
acknowledge-ment of the need to address.
Secondly, the effort allowed those concerned to
take stock of the country's housing situation by
compiling and reviewing data, and identifying
both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
the shelter problem. Thirdly, a comprehensive
housing policy package was outlined which
established priorities, and a set of goals and
objectives for the short- and long-term.
Fourthly, a lengthy list of recommendations were
made which included specifications for an
improved institutional apparatus to facilitate
housing operations on a bigger scale. And
fifthly, the mission set the stage for an
important relationship between Kenya and the
international development assistance community.
Without securing substantial amounts of foreign
aid, the prospects for the implementation of a
large-scale housing program in Kenya were bleak.
Armed with the comprehensive housing policy
package, and with institutional changes under
way, the Kenyan Government was in a favorable
position to request financial and technical
assistance.
As an example, in 1973, Kenya was concurrently
138
negotiating loans for housing programs from the
Commonwealth Developnent Corporation (CDC),,
United States Ajency of International
Developnent (USAID) and the World Bank
(IBRD/IDA). During the 1970's, much of
Nairobi's large-scale public sector housing
developnent was built with foreign financing of
one sort or another. The Bloomberg-Abrams
report put Kenya's housing program on track and
it is amazing how valid many of the
recommendations contained in this report have
remained over time. Bloomberg and Abrams
offered their advice without building false
hopes:
It is clear from the foregoing that in a
country such as Kenya, and in most other
countries as well, meeting housing needs
is a goal that cannot practically be
achieved. A realistic approach to the
housing problem is to set an intermediate
target by indentifying the quantity of
dwellings that the country can build
annually within its resources. 12
The overall policy approach which they advocated
in 1964 remains valid to this day:
Whatever the size of the programme eventually
decided upon, it will have to be an austerity
programme, austere in standards and in
outlays per dwelling unit. Only the most
pressing needs can be met and devices must be
be sought which will meet maximum needs with
minimum outlays. The real issue is not
little or no housing, but how to meet the
pressures of housing need without hindering
and if possible, by stimulating the economy
as a whole.1 3
The Bloomberg-Abramas report appears to be the
first major housing document in Kenya's post-
Independence era which called for the
developnent of site-and-services projects in
urban areas. Site-and-services project, the
report argued, presented the only feasible
planned developnent alternative to squatter
settlements as the government had neither the
means to provide subsidised mass housing nor the
ability to adequately control illegal
settlement. In other words, the report was
suggesting that the only way to control
squatting was by drastically increasing the
supply of serviced urban land affordable by the
poor. The report recommended that increased
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attention be given to the following
considerations: site location; administrative
latitude; technical assistance to beneficiaries;
creation of employment opportunities within
projects; use of temporary building materials;
and a materials loan program. Bloomberg and
Abrams noted that while self-help was a necessry
technique for a certain number of families in
urban areas, it was not necessarily a panacea
for the entire housing problem.
Thus, although the report supported the site-and
-services concept as a legitimate solution to
the urban housing problem, it cautioned against
expecting too much. Various additional
socio-economic benefits derived from site-and-
services project were also pointed out. And
while the Bloomberg-Abrams report went a long
way towards surfacing major issues in Kenya's
housing policy and outlined a program framework,
it did not go far enough. With all the advan-
tages of hindsight, it is now possible to pro-
pose that the United Nations sponsored mission
would have been considerably more effective had
the two experts stayed on in Kenya for some time
to oversee implementation of their recommen-
dations. By putting a specific program firmly
in place they would have achieved a demonstation
effect and created some momentum. Almost a
decade later when the World Bank was setting up
its Kenya Urban Project Che housing program it
adopted a strategy which incorporated a substan-
tial institution-building component after this
had been identified as a major area of defi-
ciency.
Much of the work carried out by the DPD' s
Community Development Section, (CDS), was of a
facilitative nature. In the first instance,
during the DCDP's application period, the CDS's
task was to faciltate the entry of legitimate
low-income households into the pool of appli-
cants. This meant that the target population
had to be reached and informed about the DCDP,
what participation in this project entailed -
especially in terms of financial obligations -
the criteria for eligibility, and any other
relevant information. The goal was to help
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disadvantaged households make informed choices
about their possible future commitments.
Later on in the project, the CDS was charged
with the responsiblity of helping to organize
self-help building groups amongst the allottees.
Success in this respect appears to have been
limited for various reasons. Despite apparently
sensitive site planning and active programs to
foster communal activities, the level of social
interaction in the DCDP has remained relatively
low. Clusters consisting of lots grouped around
a cul-de-sac were used partly in an attempt to
promote social interaction, but Chana (1979)
reports that in very cases have households
within a single cluster successfully banded
together to form self -help building groups. 1 4
The implication is that while spatial and
institutional factors are very important, the
primary impetus for communal activities is not
provided by them. This implication would appear
to be consistent with 1ss's observations that
social networks are determined by ethnicity and
social class more than by neighborhood. 1 5
Consequentially, this casts doubt on the
viability of any form of community organization
or citizen participation which is done purely on
a spatial basis. Communal self-help projects
will probably only work so long as the
participants receive that clear, tangible, and
assured benefits result from such efforts. It
would also appear that the most successful group
efforts are those in which individual households
are responsible for working on a piece of the
task in which they have a direct, personal
stake.
Some of the lessons to be learnt about facilita-
tive strategies for change from the above
experiences are as follows: For facilitative
strategies to succeed, there must be a recogni-
tion of the need for external assistance and an
awareness of the possible availability of such
assistance. The target population or client
must be willing to request and accept this
assistance which must match their perceived
needs and personal resources. 'o the extent
that, facilitative strategies achieve change by
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enhancing the positive aspects of existing cir-
cumstances, such strategies probably display
greatest sensitivity to the context.
REEJCATIVE STRATEGIES
Reeducative strategies call for the objective
presentation of facts, and the use of reasonable
logic, to provide rational justification for a
change. This strategy relies on the target
population or client to learn for themselves,
and be sufficiently impressed by the obvious
merit and advantage of a certain course of
action on the basis of the compiled evidence.16
A frequently encountered example of a
reeducative is the following: carrying out a
survey and presenting the results together with
an analysis, conclusions and recommendations to
the client or target population. Usually, the
motive behind a survey is, initially, to provide
a factual or empirical basis for a particular
policy choice, and later, to evaluate the impact
and effectiveness of the program or project.
The Survey of Temporary Structures carried out
in 1970 under the joint auspices of the NUSG and
the N.C.C.K. provided some particularly cutting
results. This survey, which sampled squatters
from temporary or illegal settlements in several
parts of Nairobi, revealed that improved housing
standards were not regarded as a high priority
by most respondents. Squatter families in the
sample listed their priorities in the following
order:
Essential: 1. Food
Desirable:
2. Current standard of shelter on
this location
3. School fees (for those witn
children of school age)
4. Clothes
5. Money to buy land
7. Money to extend business
8. Money to build another room
(possibly for rental)
9. Money to rent or buy a better
house or room to live in
10. Improved transport to job 17
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The 1970 H.R.D.U. survey of site-and-services
schemes in urban centers across Kenya provided a
broad and substantive information base for for-
mulating and refining approaches to the various
aspects of site-and -services schemes. This
survey sought to inform decision-makers about
the pros and cons of such projects, and provide
guidelines for future schemes in terms of stan-
dards, regulations and administrative proce-
dures. It is not clear whether this survey
report received sufficient offical attention
upon submission. In retrospect, the conclusions
and recommenda-tions based on the results of the
survey foresaw many of the difficulties which
would arise later in larger schemes. Amongst
the changes called for by this report were:
- relaxation of planning and building standards
in order to achieve greater affordability;
- allowance of dwelling constructed in timber;
- avoidance of communal services wherever
possible;
- provision of waterborne sanitation and piped
water per lot whenever practicable;
- provision of street-lighting in all schemes;
- organizing of the poorest allottees into
building cooperatives;
- outlawing of absentee-landlordship;
- design of dwelling type plans which
facilitated flexible and incremental
developnent, and which provided greater
privacy and convenient sub-letting of some
rooms;
- provision of road maintenance and garbage
collection by local authorities in exchange
for user fees. 1 8
According to the authors of this report, the
major finding of the survey was that: The
basic unit in existing site and service schemes
is the room not the dwelling.1 9 Survey
respondents were also ask to state their main
complaint about their living circumstances and
the following ranking, beginning with the most
often-voiced complaint, was obtained:
1. condition of toilets
2. high rents
3. lack of road lighting
4. distance to shopping
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5. distance to work
6. dirt and rubbish
7. rats
8. condition of roads
9. lack of space
10. lack of electricity
11. poor transport
12. bad landlords
13. lack of security
14. external access to toilets
15. poor water-supply
16. lack of social hall20
This list indicated possible areas for
improvement in future schemes.
In 1978-1979 the H.R.D.U. carried out a compre-
hensive evaluation of the overall site-and-
services program in Kenya.2 1 The main task was
to compare the achievements in this field with
the planned objectives as spelt out in the five-
year national development plans, identify the
specific problem areas, and make concrete and
constructive proposals for improved program per-
formance. The evaluation concentrated on
questions of policy formulation and program
definition including:
- degree to which site-and-services schemes had
been accepted by both public officials,
politicians, and project beneficiaries;
- availability of finances, qualified manpower
and suitable land as and when required during
the project planning and implementation
stages;
- definition of the target population;
- ability of allottees to comply with minimum
building standards;
- forms of assistance extended to allottees;
- prevention of illegal lot transfers;
- mechanism for eviction; .
- application procedure and selection of
allottees;
- incidence of undeveloped lots;
- ability to control sub-letting
The Monitoring and Evaluation Study of Phase One
of the DCDP is another example of a reeducative
strategy. Valuable insight into the details of
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the implementation and consolidation stages has
been provided by the continuous data
gathering, information processing and feedback
process. The additional insight has been used
to revise and refine the later phases of the
DCDP. The Urban Edge ccmmends the careful
monitoring in Phase one of the DCDP by Senga,
Ndeti, and Associates, independent consultants
to the IBRD, and by the H.R.D.U.2 2 A multi-
disciplinary team closely monitored the activi-
ties of both officials and allottees during the
consolidation of Phase Oe between 1977 and
1979. Periodically, the team produced detailed
reports. Apart from providing a painstaking
account of the process as it unfolded, these
reports, indirectly, also voiced some allottee
concerns, and thus fulfilled an advocacy role.
Some of the recommendations made by the
monitoring groups have been incorporated in
later phases of the DCDP, and in
site-and-services schemes elsewhere in Kenya.
These recommendations included:
- encouraging greater use of local materials;
- better maintenance of public infrastructure by
the relevant authorities
- more timely provision of community facilities;
- elimination of publicly-built sanitary cores
on individual lots;
- more on-site police protection to prevent
robberies and violence.
In its efforts to convince the Kenyan authori-
ties of the effectiveness of site-and-services
schemes, the IBRD used what may be termed a
reeducative strategy. A team of Kenyan
officials were encouraged to visit a World-Bank
- sponsored site-and-services scheme in Lusaka,
Zambia - a context not altogether dissimilar
from Nairobi's - and take a first-hand look.
2 4
The visit did indeed take place, and appears to
have elicited a favorable response, as events
thereafter indicate. The IBRD used a reeduca-
tive strategy to get Kenya's policy-makers to
address the institutional problems associated
with long-term soluctions to Kenya' s rapid urban
growth. In order to consummate the loan
agreement for the DCDP the IBRD insisted that
studies be carried out in the areas of municipal
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finance, squatter upgrading, and the project
preparation and management capabilities of
housing agencies within local authorities as the
NHC.
For reeducative strategies to be effective, the
client or target population must be receptive
to the information provided. Furthermore this
information must be in form which may be
communicated and comprehended without great
difficulty. In general, reeducative strategies
are likely to be time consuming, and unlikely to
produce quick, dramatic results. The effect of
reeducative strategies will usually be more
pronounced in the longer-term. Reeducative
strategies, if successful, will transform
attitudes, but may not necessarily alter
behavior. This type of strategy appeals to the
element of reason within the client or target
population and counts on rational responses and
the use of good judgement. An important
spin-off of reeducative strategies may be the
discovery and development of new ways and means.
PERSUASIVE STRATEGIES
Persuasive strategies rely on the deliberate and
specific use of factors such as: overwhelming
logic; a compelling idea or image; a successful
experiment; a shining example; a convincing
argument or theory; peer group pressure;
political or financial gain; or the the weight
of expert opinion, to influence the client or
target population to adopt a particular form of
change, or take a certain alternative course of
action.25
The prolonged controversy over appropriate
standards of infrastructure between the DCDP
designers and the NCC's Medical Officer of
Health (MOH) is a conspicuous example of
circumstances where persuasive strategies were
employed. on the one hand, the DCDP designers
argued that the lowered standards allowed for
increased economy and greater affordability
without jeopardizing the overall functioning of
the services system and endangering the health
of the public. The MOH, on the other hand,
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contended that the lowered standards created
potentially unhygenic conditions which would
pose a serious public health hazard. The NCC's
Water and Sewage Department also participated in
this raging debate and maintained that the
lowered standards made for inconvenient and
costly maintenance.
Although many observers of this episode have
tended to side with the project designers, it
must be said that the MOH did have reasonable
justification for lodging his complaints. He
could point to the poor hygenic conditions
prevailing in some of Nairobi's lower-income
housing estates, admittedly, often in situations
where sanitary facilities were shared by more
than one household. Others have echoed concerns
s imilar to those expressed by the MOH. In 1975
the H.R.D.U. carried out a detailed survey of a
low-income neighborhood in Masaku, a town
located about fifth kilometers south-east of
Nairobi. The survey covered Socio-economic,
technical and environmental health aspects.
With specific reference to sanitary facilities
in the low-income settlement, Hoek-Smit (1976)
suggests that the provision of better facili-
ties in itself is not sufficient to guarantee an
improvement of the health condition of a
community; a proper control and under-standing
of the usage of the facilities is equally
essential.26
In a paper presented in 1976 on Kenya's
Housing Policy, the Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry of Housing and Social Services
remarked about the need to educate
low-income occupants about the appropriate
utilization of kitchen and sanitary
facilities. 2
7
The above two instances strongly suggest
that the MOH had sufficent grounds for
concern. He was not unjustified in
anticipating problems with the DCDP's
sanitary facilities, and calling for higher
standards made sense from his perspective.
All this goes to show just how debateable
this issue of appropriateness of standards
was, and that its resolution posed a tricky
problem. Both opposing camps had reasonably
strong cases to support their respective
position. The deadlock was broken by the
intervention of the Town Clerk who used his
position to rule in fabor of the DCDP
designers. However, when the detailed design of
Phase Two of the DCDP was under way, and a new
Town Clerk was in office, the same debate was
raised again. Expensive delays resulted while
lengthy negotiations took place between offi-
cials to the NCC, Central Government
bureaucrats, and representatives of the IBRD.
Ultimately, a costly compromise solution was
worked out.
This episode illustrates several problems
inherent in the use of persuasive
strategies. When two or more parties resort
to the use of alternative persuasive
strategies, there is considerable potential
for serious deadlock. Persuasive strategies
may have a tendency to precipitate
adversarial relationships: situations
involving the use of such strategies are
likely to deteriorate into action-reaction
phenomena, particularly if the parties
involved perceive that they stand to loose
or gain considerably in terms of personal
or political prestige as a result of the
eventual outcome.
Another example of the use of competing
persuasive strategies is provided by the
dispute over the standards for provision of
car-parking and direct vehicular access to
each lot. While the DCDP designers
presented a technical argument based on
inconclusive data, the opposing councillors
expressed their position in stronger
political terms, and were thus able to
secure the upper hand.
When a deadlock does occur, some mechanism
to break it must be available as a last
resort if the decision-making process is to
continue functioning. Constructive
intervention under such circumstances may
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take the form of mediation, arbitration or
the issuance of an executive order by the
powers that be. The choice of intervention
will be indicated by the perceived degree
of willingness (or lack thereof) to
negotiate, and the constraints imposed by
the expenditure of time, money and political
capital.
As is now apparent, persuasive strategies
rapidly emerge in situations involving
competition or conflict. The DCDP
experience also illustrates the classic
weakness of the rational-technical school of
planning in its ability to resolve conflicts
of opinion over so-called technical matters.
A considerable body of planning literature
now exists - for example, Kaufmann (1978)28
Stretton (1978)29 and Friedman (1971)30
-which recognizes the socio-political basis
for decision-making. Planning is seen
as being concerned with the distribution of
losses and gains. Suggestions are being made
for alternative frameworks for socio-political
consensus-building which involve more par-
ticipatory institutional structures, mechanisms
for negotiation and bargaining, and the for-
mation of common interest-based cooperative
networks.31
Persuasive strategies provide a viable option
for overcoming resistance in the short-term.
Well-prepared persuasive strategies may be quite
effective when specific issues are the focus of
planned change.
POWER STRAGETIGES
Power strategies involve the use of
legitimate authority, threats or the use of
force to compel a client or target population to
comply with, or adopt, the called for change.
3 2
A glaring example of the use of a power
strategy is provided by President Jomo
Kenyatta's apparent order to begin work
immediately on the Mathare Redevelop'nent
Scheme in 1969. In a similar manner, work
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on the scheme was abruptly stopped in 1972.
The World Bank also used a power strategy of
sorts to hasten completion of the final pieces
of the project preparation for Dandora: it
threatened to cease its involvement and withdraw
all of its valuable financial support. Since
the World Bank was in a strong bargaining posi-
tion at the time, both the Kenyan Government and
the NCC jumped. Clearly the line between per-
suasive and power strategies can be a very fine
one at times, particularly where participants
may have somewhat different perceptions of
actions taken by one or the other.
The danger with forcing change is that it may be
difficult to reverse in the event that later
this proves necessary. obviously, power strate-
gies will have to be employed, given that the
power is available, when there is no other way
to overcome resistance and action is necessi-
tated by circumstances. Where competing
interests occupy unequal positions in a social,
economic or political hierarchy, there is a
greater likelihood of power plays occuring.
Power strategies naturally require sources of
power, or power bases. Major change may be
achieved relatively quickly through the use of
power strategies and there is the possibility of
using the element of surprise to advantage. The
unanticipated use of a power move will likely
catch potential resistance off guard.
ATTITUDES AMONGST PUBLIC OFFICIALS
When Kenya formally attained National Indepen-
dence in December 1963, the country entered a
whole new social, economic and political era.
African needs and aspirations which had been
neglected during the colonial period had to be
catered to rapidly and visibly. The new govern-
ment had to make a demonstrable qualitative and
quantitative break with the colonial past. Sym-
bols of freedom. progress and modernity which
represented independent Kenya had tremendous
significance as manifestations of social and
political achievement. All public edifices, to
the extent .that they were cultural artifacts,
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had to be acceptable in the new context.
It was in this type of socio-political climate
with the accompanying attitudes on the part of
public officials, that the concept of
site-and-services had to be adopted, developed
and implemented as a valid solution to the needs
of the urban poor. The colonial administra-
tion's record of practice in the area of housing
for Africans was poor at best. In this regard,
official attitudes had been generally uncaring,
sometimes inhuman, and occasionally paterna-
listic. Africans were treated literally as a
disease against which housing and planning
policy was used to practice preventive medicine.
Needless to say, African officials and
politicians were anxious to distance themselves
from such policies and practices. Decision-
makers were loathe to support any policy or
program which could be constructed as resembling
colonial practices in the area of low-income
housing. Time and time again opinions were
forcefully made to the effect that the
authorities must not be responsible for the
further creation of planned slums.
In his Annual Report of 1970, the then Director
of the NCC's Department of Housing and Social
services wrote the following:
What the engineers considered to be good
designs based on sensitive planning and
reasonable financial disciplines, was
often questioned deferred in committees,
and otherwise delayed. As represent-
atives of the pople, they must be satis-
fied that what they are offering to the
public is whate is wanted.33
An example of the types of criticisms voiced by
councillors is contained in the following
excerpt from the 1969-70 Minutes of the social
Services and Housing Committee:
A member informed the committee that the
Layout plan of certain City Council houses
did not provide maximum conveniences to the
tenants and suggested that in future, offi-
cers should consider housing layout plans
which would offer maximum conveniences for
the occupiers...
A member of the committee reported that the
tenant-purchase houses at Uhuru and
Kariobangi Estates were too close together
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and each house should have been built on its
own plot. Consequently, these houses did not
provide maximum conveniences to the occu-
piers.
The City Engineer reported that the layout
and designs of these houses were in accor-
dance with designs approved by this commit-
tee. The prices charged to the purchasers
were most reasonable and if the houses were
constructed on separate plots the price would
have been considerably higher.3 4
one of the most influential critics of Kenya's
low-cost shelter programs was none other than
the President himself. The President's
strongest statement on this issue was made in
July 1972 during the opening of a pilot low-cost
housing scheme. What he saw appears to have
provoked him considerably. The following
account was contained in a local newspaper:
President Kenyatta warned at the weekend
he will sack any of his Ministers who
continue to treat Kenyans as the
colonialists did by building them native-
type houses not suitable for human habi-
tation. He said all those charged with
the responsibility of building houses for
Wananchi, especially in towns, must
ensure that the houses built are suit-
able for a family to live in.
Mzee Kenyatta recalled that in the olden
days Africans were provided with poor
quality houses known as 'native houses'
not fit for human beings to occupy. The
houses were not adequate to accommodate
families and lacked such amenities as
water, sanitation or light.
'I will sack any of my Ministers who con-
tinues to treat Wananchi of independent
Kenya in this manner,' the President
said.
Saying that the time has gone when the
people of Kenya should be treated in such
a manner, Mzee Kenyatta also said that
his Government would vigorously engage
itself in clearing slums throughout the
country.35
Some months previous to this event, a
meeting of high-level government decision-
makers had resolved that the site-and-
services approach was unsuitable for Kenya's
cities.36 This resolution was made despite
the fact that Kenya's Development Plan,
1970-1974 clearly stipulated that site-and-
services schemes were to be a significant
153
part of the housing program in urban
areas.3 7 This position was later quietly
reversed so as not to jeopardize large
anounts of developement assistance from the
World Bank and other similar aid sources.
The reaction against site-and-services
schenes, particularly the visual appearance
of such schemes, seems to stem from
perceptions and values contitioned by the
colonial heritage as well as the privileged
circumstances of Kenya's African ruling
elite. During the colonial era, the resi-
dential environments and lifestyle of the
European population were the absolute envy
of the other races. The residential areas
reserved exclusively for Europeaons occupied the
best land in terms of natural features and ame-
nities. Such areas were characterized by their
low densities and spacious, well-constructed
bungalow-type dwellings with separate servants'
quarters amidst large lots which had generous
planting and manicured lawns. There can be no
denying the long-term influence of this type of
residential environment on the desires and pre-
ferences of future residents. Furthermore, most
of today's delive in such surroundings, as do
most of the well-meaning technicians working on
low-cost shelter programs. This raises another
tricky and delicate socio-political issue. Even
those in positions of authority and respon-
sibility who realise the impracticality of advo-
cating higher residential standards, feel
reluctant to display much enthusiasm for low-
cost shelter programs such as site-and-services
and squatter slum upgrading. Amidst the overall
situation where the gap between the rich and the
poor in cities is increasingly visible, there is
the fear of being labelled a purveyor of double
standards. And if housing opportunities and
squalid living conditions are viewed in a wider
context of socio-economic inequities, then, as
Kenya's Minister for Housing warned in August
1972, housing problems can create 'a dangerous
political situation' especially where some
people have big houses while others have
none. 38
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The element of risk is frequently present in
ventures involving technical and institutional
change, and the minimization of risk is usually
a concern at the forefront in the minds of
public officials, and others in positions with
high degrees of responsibility and accoun-
tability. Such persons generally display a ten-
dency towards financial and political
conservatism.
Risk is a measure of the degree of uncertainty
involved in achieving the change, and the
penalty for failure. Uncertainty depends on,
amongst other things, the folowing factors:
complexity of the task in hand; previous
experience and track record; quality and quan-
tity of relevant information; scale of
operation; interests of participants; and pre-
vailing official attitudes. The more safety-
valves and fail-safe mechanisms which can be
built into a change system, particularly an
experimental one, the more secure and willing
proponents, supporters and the target population
are likely to be. The relative ease with which
the effects of an innovation may be reversed,
erased, or discontinued will impact the degree
of risk attached to change proposals.
From the account presented, it is quite clear
that the DCDP involved considerable financial
and political risks. The Kariobangi and Mathare
had not set positive precedents, and favorable
attitudes towards site-and-services were not
likely to be immediately forthcoming. In the
final analysis, the promise of World Bank
financing appears to have carried the day.
As originally planned the size and content of
the DCDP was enough to virtually constitute a
satellite town in relation to Nairobi. Nothing
similar to this venture had been previously
implemented by the authorities in Nairobi. The
large scale and dimensions of the project, along
with all the accompanying bureaucratic and poli-
tical factors did nothing to soothe the anxieties
of those likely to be responsible for the
decision-making.
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In this respect, the breaking down of the pro-
ject into phases, and the particular staging
sequence chosen, did much to allay the fears of
those concerned with the project. This, in
fact, was a crucial aspect of the planning and
project design. The capital outlay for each
separate phase of the project was held to a
minimum. The site layout facilitated incremen-
tal growth, and the infrastructural network
could be expanded and developed in synchrony
with demand. This allowed for fluidity in the
decision-making process and the commitment of
resources. It also meant that mid-course
corrections were much more feasible, and that if
the project was discontinued for any extraor-
dinary reason, at least what had been started
could probably be completed, thereby not
resulting in a totally wasted effort.
THE ROLE OF EXPATRIATES
Given the dynamics of Nairobi's political and
administrative environments, it is hardly
surprising that expatriates functioning in both
official and unofficial capacities appear to be
at the forefront of attempts to introduce and
implement low-cost ideas about urban shelter.
The various detailed accounts of housing activi-
ties in the public sector - Beardmore (1978)39,
Stren (1978)40, Werlin (1974)41, Temple (1973)42
- all contain examples of such instances.
Most such expatriates are relatively secure in
the knowledge that they are in Kenya only on a
temporary basis. They realize that there is
considerably less risk of their own future
careers being jeopardized when running counter
to prevailing local official attitudes, than
would be the case for Kenyans who have to spend
their whole lives living and working in that
context, and who, therefore, must tread the
waters of officialdom with much greater caution
and conservatism.
Included in Temple's study of the structure and
dynamics of the Nairobi City Council is the
following passage which deals with the above -
mentioned issues:
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For a variety of reasons, much of the ini-
tiative in the City Council for low-cost
housing has come from expatriate officers.
Given the prevailing attitudes described
above, it is obvious to most African officers
who want to get ahead that advocacy of low-
cost housing is not hte best channel for
upward mibility. Those Africans who are
interested in fostering low-cost housing tend
to adopt a low profile, being somewhat reluc-
tant to push very hard or very visibly.
furthermore, many of the Council's African
staff share the prevalent attitudes about
housing and, therefore, have little inclina-
tion to promote inexpensive housing. 4 3
As Temple goes on to say, many of the
expatriates in Kenya are of a particular breed
or social mould. Young, idealistic and energe-
tic, they were motivated by typical Western
liberal concerns for the poor and filled with
reformist attitudes. Such attitudes were espe-
cially visible amongst those who had experienced
the socio-political dynamism and liberalization
in the United States of America during the
decade of the 1960's Thus, enthusiasm about
low-cost housing programs was pervasive amongst
such expatriate staff in the NCC and elsewhere.
These well-intentioned missionaries who
believed that theirs was the only road to
salvation were insensitive to the needs of a
proud, young, and deprived nation, hungry for
all the fruits of independence and progress.
Expatriate staff, arguably, were a mixed
blessing. Many were working on unfamiliar
cultural and administrative terrain, and spent
half the duration of their contracted stay just
learning the ropes as it were. High turnover
of personnel robbed planning and implementation
efforts of much needed continuity. Levels of
competence, support, commitment and enthusiasm
remained in constant flux. Poor leadership exa-
cerbated the problems, and frequent policy or
program changes made leadership of technical
groups none too easy.
Expatriate staff were often at a disadvantage
when communicating with their African counter-
parts and decision-makers who were not unjusti-
fiably suspicious of overly zealous foreigners.
157
The utter contempt and countless abuses which
had been directed at Africans by the British
colonial administration were still relatively
fresh in African memories.
Expatriates may also not have been aware of the
trade-offs involved in their policy choice.
Recently, one observer expressed skepticism
regarding the ablity of outside planners to per-
ceive the factors important to decision-makers
within Third World governments:
The main problem is that as outsiders,
they do not understand the decision-
making process in the countries they are
advising; they usually think that things
are worse than they factually] are; and
they plan according to their conception of
the problem. The fact that...[they].. .don't
see the local decision-makers' rationale,
doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. There is
certainly no such thing as the rational
plan.44
There are those amongst the developnent
assistance community who believe that their
appropriate role is to provide technical aid.
The language, and the avowed aim of this aid, is
politically neutral. The effect of this so-
called technical aid, in many cases, has been to
place yet another tool in the hands of the elite
that widens the gap between the rich and the
poor. 4 5 Stamp (1980) argues that:
To ignore politics is to take a political
stance - a stance in support of the status
quo - and almost everywhere in the Third
World this means favoring the established
elites above the needs and aspirations or
ordinary people. 46
Thus, in every instance where planning is
redistrbutive and seriously attempts to address
the issue of overwhelming inequality, planners
must be willing to take, and pursue, a political
stance. Having said this, the extreme dif-
ficulty involved with such action has to be
acknowledged, and it must be noted that there
will be occasions where political action may
prove to be counter-productive, particularly in
the shorter-term.
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SITE-AND-SERVICES AS CHANGE
This thesis predicates that site-and-services
represents change in two ways: a) it is an
addition to the stock of housing options
available in Nairobi; and b) site-and-services
schemes are important vehicles for achieving
socio-economic and political change. A set of
special attributes are believed to be important
for the substance of change and this chapter
explores those attributes in the specific case
of site-and-services schemes in Nairobi. These
special attributes have to do with the ability
to introduce, communicate, comprehend, accept,
adopt, utilize, modify, improve and sustain the
change. The list of attributes used here is
based upon the work of Zaltman and Duncan
(1977)1, Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck (1973)2 and
Rogers (1962)3. The list is as follows:
- Costs and Benefits;
- Efficiency;
- Complexity;
- Complementarity;
- Divisibility;
- Propensity for Further Development;
- Communicability.
Each item in this list is discussed separately
in this chapter. Following this discussion is a
commentary on attitudes amongst public officials
and the role of expatriates in the planning
process in Nairobi.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
When public programs must compete for scarce
resources, costs and benefits are primary
concerns. For the purposes of this discussion
the financial and social aspects of costs and
benefits will be analysed separately.
Financial:
Financial cost considerations played a central
role in encouraging the application of the
site-and-services concept in Nairobi. As far as
the British colonial administration was con-
cerned, site-and-services provided a way of
minimising public expenditure on housing for
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Africans. Fbr the independent African govern-
ment, site-and-services has allowed for the more
scarce public resources for facilitating urban
growth and development.
Financial cost is obviously one of the most
important attributes of any change proposal.
Measurable and manipulable, financial cost is
the primary yardstick used for making choices in
the public policy arena. The Kenyan Government,
despite its declaration that the minimum
requirement for a decent home was to be a habi-
table two-roomed house constructed of permanent
materials with a separate kitchen and basic
sanitary facilities such as toilet and shower
compartment,4 realized that only a few could
afford a complete house at the minimum official
standard of two-rooms.5  As early as 1967, the
Minister of Housing and Social Services pointed
out that:
The ideal house, in which we would all
like to live or to build for the people
of this country, will tend usually to be
much more expensive than we or they can
actually afford.6
As the population grew, housing costs also
escalated, and living conditions deteriorated.
Amidst these developments the Government's
switch in emphasis from building complete houses
to some form of aided self-help strategy was
inevitable. By mid-1970, local cost data in
favor of site-and-services schemes was
overwhelming. According to figures for units
completed by the NHC between 1969 and 1975, the
average cost of a site-and-services unit was
approximately K Shs 4,000 as compared to about
K Shs 32,000 for a conventional NHC housing
unit.7 At this rate for every one conventional
unit, eight site-and-services units could have
been provided. In Phase One of the DCDP, the
actual cost per unit upon completion in 1976,
ran from K Shs 8,838 for the smallest, least
expensive option to K Shs 17,259 for the largest
lots with contractor-built wet-cores. 8
Many officials in the housing field also share
the view that:
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...a self-help participant can build his
house far more cheaply than any public
agency could. He also knows what
standard he can afford at a certain
stage. 9
However, preliminary data for the DCDP does not
fully support the view that self-help is signi-
ficantly cheaper. 1 0  In addition, sample surveys
revealed that only twenty-two percent of the
labor component in Phase Che of the DCDP was of
a self-help nature. 1 1  This suggests that the
participation of allottees in the actual
construction of the dwellings is an aspect that
needs reexamination. In his detailed study of
self-help in the DCDP, Soni (1980) comes to the
conclusion that:
Rarely does the allottee participate in
the actual construction1 2
and that the subcontract form of self-help,
where the allottee assembles a construction team
to carry out the bulk of the construction work,
is prevalent. one of the likely explanations
is that for the majority of allottees in Phase
One of the DCDP, the savings anticipated from
owner-building cannot have been substantial or
significant. However, there is the additional
factor of the dwelling construction having to
match required standards as a condition for
obtaining a building loan. Soni (1980) argues
that many allottees do not possess the skills to
construct a dwelling that is of an acceptable
official standard.1 3
According to the DCDP Monitoring and Evaluation
Study slightly more than one person from every
14
four plots is employed within the project in
small businesses and in households. Further-
more, the study discovered that one allottee in
every ten allottee-occupied plots (i.e. 1/2 of
the total) is self-employed in Dandora.1 5
Ironically, a factor contributing to this state
of affairs may be the fact that the project site
is somewhat isolated and located on the urban
periphery. The nearest off-site facilities for
obtaining everyday goods and services are not
within close or convenient proximity, and thus
the demand for on-site supply of such consumer
goods and services is created. In some ways,
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the DCDP's relative isolation has fostered a
type of self-sufficiency, paricularly since the
project's population provides a sizeable market.
While, the relatively low per-unit cost of site-
and-services schemes means increased af ford-
ability, it also allows for a fixed public
expenditure to be distributed over a much
greater number of households. Limited resources
are thereby utilized in a more equitable manner.
Increased economy coupled with effective cost-
recovery will facilitate replicability.
Cost recovery appears to have been one of the
DCDP's success stories. A report published in
1979 which summarized the World Bank's experi-
ences with four substantially completed urban
shelter projects in the Eastern Africa region,
noted that Kenya had been an exception in terms
of not having major problems with cost
recovery.16 One of the main reasons why cost
recovery in the DCDP has been so successful is
because allottees have sub-let rooms, and in
some cases whole units (which is illegal), to
obtain additional income. The monitoring team
suggests that about half of the allottees in
Phase one of the DCDP increased their incomes by
more than fifty percent by subletting rooms.17
The H.R.D.U. takes a somewhat dim view of this
type of practice by stating that it is indispu-
table that the site-and-services program is
creating a landlord class amongst the
allottees.18
Social:
Much of the criticism levelled against site-and-
services schemes may be grouped under this
attribute of the so-called change. The msot
vociferons critics of the site-and-services
concept tend to be those who are of liberal,
left-wing, or a radical idealogical persuasion,
and who thus identify the concept with all the
ills, inequities and unjusticies (social,
economic and political), of the capitalist
system. A recent broad-ranging critique of
self-help housing is presented by a number of
well-known authors in Self-Help Housing:
A Critique.19 Site-and-services schemes are
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alleged to exacerbate socio-econamic differences
and divisions by concentrating the urban poor in
ghettos. Frequently, such ghettos are located
on urban peripheries, as is the case with the
DCDP and the Kariobangi scheme. In the hands of
ruling elites in Third World countries, site-
and-services is seen as a tool for placating, or
manipulating, the poor without bringing them
into the mainstream of the national or urban
economy. Predictably, such critics call for a
radical transformation of the political economy.
Although, as the years pass and gradual con-
solidation of developnent takes place, during
the planning stage insufficient importance is
given to the fact that: the activities carried
out by the poor, or the jobs held by them, are
often quite closely linked to the activities of
the 'modern' sector. 2 0
Adverse impacts due to their peripheral location
appear to have been minimal in both the DCDP and
the Kariobangi scheme. Observations made by
Soni (1980) during Phase one of the DCDP
suggested that the socio-economic changes
experienced by allottees were of three basic
kinds. 2 1
- Ce group experienced an improvement in
economic status as a result of the additional
household income derived from subletting.
- A second group experienced increased economic
hardship accompanied by social and domestic
stress. The plight of this relatively snall,
and presumably poorer, group of households,
was reflected in their failure to meet their
various financial obligations on a regular
(mostly monthly) basis. Other difficult
circumstance were evident amongst such
families: children's school attendance was
affected; nutrition was poor; and dwellings
were generally of a poorer quality and often
less well-maintained. To allottees facing
such problems, the temptation to sell their
lots for a lump sum was naturally very great.
However, the lease agreement signed by all
allottees prevented them form selling their
lots to willing buyers within the first five
years of occupancy. Evidence from sample
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surveys suggests that between seven to ten
percent of the lots in Phase Cre had been
illegally transferred by mid - 1978.22 Some
officials were predictably disturbed by this
occurence, but political considerations and
intervention by influential figures have made
evictions unlikely.
- A third group of allottees comprised those
households who experienced little or no change
in their socio-economic status.
A tendency for household size to vary according
to economic circumstances was observed. 2 3
economic prospects improve household size seems
to increae. With the advent of hardship the
number of household members seems to decline. A
possible explanation, consistent with tradi-
tional African cultural norms, is that the
benefits of upward mobility are shared with
members of the extended family.
Included amongst the various notions about the
social benefits of self-help is that it
stimulates the development of community
organizations which will then have beneficial
effects on the future development of the
project. In the DCDP participants were
encouraged to form building groups based on
traditional norms of Africa mutual help. While
surveys found that only sixteen percent of the
allottees in Phase One participated in such
groups, for unemployed or self-employed women
such groups were especially useful.2
4
These groups were based on a system whereby
each member was required to make a small
monthly contribution to a group fund, from which
members could then draw upon in rotation for
purposes of completing their dwellings. The
Director of the NCC' s Housing Developnent
Department (of which the DPD was the forerunner)
reported that with technical assistance from
project staff members of such groups were able
to build more rapidly than other allottees
thereby also fostering community cohesion and
spirit.25
When the H.H.D.U. surveyed the Kariobangi
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scheme in 1969, it came across a building
cooperative which had constructed twenty-two
dwellings. The cooperative had used a type
plan from the NCC, purchased and transported its
own materials, hired artisans to do the actual
building, and achieved an average erection time
of two months per dwellng. Quite remarkably,
this cooperative had managed to obtain a loan
from the NCC, as well the services of an
engineer who supervised the work by making
weekly site-visits. 2 6
EFFICIENCY
This attribute is primarily a measure of the
effectiveness with which resources, usually
scarce, have been used.
Site-and-services allows a much larger
proportion of the public funds available for
urban developnent to be spent on infrastructure
than would be the case with more expensive con-
ventional public housing projects. Therefore,
greater economies-of-scale can be achieved by
installing urban infrastructure over larger
areas. Unfortunately, in Phase One of the DCDP
such cost savings were eroded by delays in
implementation.
Since for each component of a site-and-services
scheme there are a variety of alternative
options, theoretically this allows for the
creation of shelter packages which can be
tailored to the specific needs and means of the
target population.
By providing the relatively disadvantaged with
the opportunity of investing in a secure and
inflation-proof commodity, site-and-services has
been able to mobilize private savings. Apart
from the sweat equity provided by underutilized
labor, the proportion of private funds invested
in housing far exceeds the amount of public
funds. There is conflicting evidence about
whether in the DCDP many allottees receive money
frm their rural kin, which is then invested in
the construction of dwellings. 2 7
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Generally, when labor-intensive methods and
techniques are employed in housing production,
employment creation has been found to be a
significant economic benefit.2 8 The multiplier
effect due to economic activity in the housing
and construction sector has also been found to
be relatively high.2 9 For Phase one in the
DCDP, the available data in this area is
inconclusive, although, on the basis of visual
observation, it can be said that in the
construction of dwellings by allottees, the use
of capital-intensive methods has been virtually
non-existent.
CCPLEKITY
This attribute concerns the degree to which the
change is made up of complicated or interrelated
parts.
Planning, programming, designing and imple-
menting a site-and-services schemes is a complex
task. This aspect may be simply illustrated by
listing the major components and sub-components
of a typical scheme 3 0 .
(1) Physical:
- site location
- land uses (institutional, commercial,
industrial, residential, recreational,
public vs. private)
- densities
- lot sizes
- infrastructure (water-supply, sewerage,
roads, walkways, storm-water drainage,
electricity, street lighting, refuse
collection, etc.)
- level of services provided on the lot
(contractor-built wet-core, individual
connections available to lots, communal
sanitary facilities)
(2) Economic:
- capital investment
- recurring costs
- affordability
- financing options
- rate of return
- cross-subsidies
- income-generating activities (formal and
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informal sectors)
- opportunity costs
(3) Administrative Legal:
- cost recovery
- tenure arrangements building standards
and their enforcement
- technical assistance
- administration of loans
- project publicity
- lot allocation
- monitoring and evaluation
- control of sub-letting, absentee
landlords and illegal transfers of
titles
(4) Social:
- social facilities (schools, health
centers, places of worship, recreation
facilities)
- community developnent assistance
(nutrition, child-care, preventive
health-care, adult-literacy classes,
organizing self-help building groups,
setting-up craft industries, etc.)
The above list is by no means complete; it is
merely suggestive of the many and varied compo-
nents, each of which requires special con-
sideration. Delivery needs to be appropriately
timed and coordinated, not an easy task con-
sidering the number of separate public agencies
which are likely to be involved. All things
considered, the DCDP appears to have done
remarkably well in light of its obvious
complexity.
COMPLEM ENTARITY
This attribute concerns the ability of the
change to interact positively, perhaps even
synergistically, with the other components of a
larger system. While the intrinsic value of the
proposed change may or may not be high, it may
nonetheless be profitably deployed to fill in a
critical gap in an assemblage or process.
Increasingly, site-and-services are being
programmed in conjunction with squatter area
upgrading projects. This has been found to be a
more balanced low-cost shelter strategy; while
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site-and-services schemes provide a means for
increasing the housing stock, upgrading projects
preserve and improve the existing housing stock.
Furthermore, upgrading inevitably leads to a
certain percentage (commonly twenty to twenty-
five percent) of households being displayed due
to dwellings being demolished in order to make
room for the installation of the basic infra-
structure consisting of access roads, sewers and
water supply lines. The inclusion of social
facilities may entail the similar displacement
of more households. This spillover of house-
holds from upgrading projects may be conveni-
ently relocated in site-and-services schemes,
preferably in comparable locations. Thus,
upgrading projects take some of the pressure
off site-and-services schemes, which in turn
facilitate the former's implementation.
The complementarity between site-and-services
schemes and upgrading projects has been
recognized in Kenya. In the World Bank' s Second
Urban Project, currently well under way, plans
call for the upgrading of one dwelling unit for
every six serviced lots. An interesting example
is in Mathare Valley where an upgrading project
and a site-and-services scheme will be imple-
mented adjacent to each other.
DIVISIBILITY
Divisibility is defined as the degree to which
change may be tried on a limited basis. It is
argued that if the proposed change can be sub-
divided into smaller pieces which can be indivi-
dually tested and implemented if need be, then
achievement of change-oriented goals and objec-
tives will be better facilitated. While several
marginal changes may be easier to achieve than a
single major change, under certain circumstances
a big, bold proposal may capitivate peoples'
imagination and attract wide support. This is a
matter of judgement.
The advantage of trying the proposed change on a
limited basis are that: a) the risk are consid-
erably reduced; and b) a pilot project may help
to iron out the kinks in the system. Clearly,
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it is possible to plan, design and implement a
site-and-services scheme on a limited basis, in
that a relativley small number of serviced lots
may be provided. The disadvantage here is that
the cost savings due to economies-of-scale will
probably not be that significant. This depends
on what the minimum threshold number of units is
in order to start achieving significant
economies-of-scale.
Site-and-services schemes are also divisible in
the sense that they consist of essential comr-
ponents and variable componentss.31 Essential
components are the lots for building, water
supply, waste-disposal and access ways. Street
lighting is also increasingly being considered
as an essential component. Variable components
are provision of: social services and facili-
ties (schools, health clinics, canmunity
centers, police posts, recreation areas and the
like); facilities for various types of economic
activities which generate incomes and provide
employment opportun; ities; technical assistance
to project beneficiaries; and credit facilities
in the form of cash, or materials, or both.
Therefore, while schemes must include the essen-
tial camponents, there is room to manoeuver with
the variable components.
This divisibility is well illustrated in the
site-and-services experience in Nairobi. While
the Kariobangi scheme provided only the essen-
tial components, each of the two successive
schemes tried to incorporate more by way of the
variable components. The DCDP now represents
the state-of-the-art in this combination of
essential and variable components.
PROPENSITY FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
This attribute governs the ability of the change
to be refined, elaborated and modified over
time.
The site-and-services concept has proven to be
remarkably amenable to development on the basis
of experience accumulated over time. Each
successive site-and-services scheme in Nairobi
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has contained a wider mix of options and
services, and an improved administrative set-up.
Measures have been taken to conciously avoid the
mistakes committed in previous schemes, as well
as to cope with new problems which surfaced.
The Kariobangi scheme of one standard sized,
almost square, lot with each group of four lots
sharing a communal sanitary facility. A uniform
grid layout was used and about sixty percent of
the total land area was taken up by circulation,
including unbuilt portions of private lots.
Inappropriately designed dwellings, high
densities and serious overcrowding created
deplorable living conditions. With virtually
whole households somehow living in a single
room, this generates a tremendous dependence on
the outdoor space immediately adjacent to
dwelling units. During fine weather much of the
day-to-day household activities such as cooking,
washing clothes and chatting with neighbors take
place outdoors. However, the site layout has
prevented the effective privatization of such
left-over space with the result that it is
inadequately maintained and inconvient to use.
The larger public open spaces throughout the
scheme are not utilized and have become waste-
lands. Seid (1974) discusses this aspect of
public housing projects in Nairobi at consider-
able length, and presents data from numerous
case studies. 3 2
The Mathare Redevelopnent Scheme which, like the
Kariobangi scheme, was planned, designed and
implemented by the NCC, attempted to solve some
of the problems encountered with the earlier
project. This time two standard lot sizes (83
m2 and 126 m2 ) were used. These lot sizes were
substantially smaller than the one at Kario-
bangi. Althought the land use proportions were
similar to Kariobangi's, there were some
significant differences. A much lower density
was planned for; 260 persons per hectare at
Mathare versus 600 persons per hectare at
Kariobangi. Unlike the latter where a very
limited number of lots had direct access by
automobile, provision was made in Mathare for
all lots to have individual automobile access.
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Another major difference in Mathare was the
number of lot options of which there were three:
lots with communal services; lots with indivi-
dual services; and lots with contractor-built
cores consisting of two rooms, a kitchen and
sanitary facilities. The original Mathare plan
also called for much more in the way of com-
munity facilitiess - schools, health clinics,
community centers, places of worship and a
police post - and for the first time, the
inclusion of commercial and industrial uses to
generate on-site enployment opportunities.
In the realm of site-and-services schemes, the
DCDP represents a quantum jump in terms of tech-
nical and institutional development. The posi-
tive impact of Phase Che of the DCDP may be
gauged in a number of alternative ways.
Experience now indicates that many poor urban
households can build their own housing to accep-
table standards, pay pack laans and meet
mortgage payments.33 The DCDP has progressed
better and faster than similar ones in other
parts of the world according to one source 3 4 ;
the rate of defaulting has been minimal; and the
majority of plot owners appear to be relatively
satisfied. A citywide program is now aiming to
provide at least 9,600 serviced lots by the end
of 1983.35
Amongst the DCDP's greatest advances were the
following: (1) A wider mix of lot options:
While the earlier schemes concentrated on
providing one standard-sized lot, at Dandora a
variety of plot sizes were available, together
with alternative levels of on-site services and
loan packages. About ninety-five percent of the
lots were of three basic types:
- Option A which was available in three dif-
ferent sizes - 100 120, and 140 m2 . Each lot
had a wet-core consisting of a toilet, shower
and outdoor washing slab.
- Option B which was also available in three
different sizes - loom2 , 120m2 and 140m2. In
addition to the wet-core outlined in Option A,
each lot was provided with a contractor-built
kitchen and store.
- Option C was available in only one plot size -
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160 m2 . Each lot had a contractor-built wet-
core, store, kitchen and one room.
Overall, 30 percent of the lots were 100 m2; 35
percent were 120 m2; 30 percent were 140 m2 ; and
5 percent were 160 m2 .
The Technical Section of the DPD prepared some
sixteen alternative house type plans which were
available to allottees. The plans varied in
terms of: number of rooms (three to nine);
number of storeys (one or two); and some layouts
were specifically designed to make for
convenient subletting. All plans attempted to
take the notion of progressive developnent into
account by allowing for construction on an
incremental room-by-room basis. Most of the
lots 1038 lots in Phase Che were of one standard
width - 6.3 meters, almost a bare minimum. This
was done in order to reduce the length of infra-
structure (roads, water supply and sewer mains,
street lighting) per unit, and thereby keep
costs low. With lot coverage generally around
fifty percent, very little open space remains on
the lot, and officials connected with the
project feel that the smaller plots are cramped.
Phase Two of the DCDP was planned to have about
2000 plots with bigger width in a range of plot
sizes. As one project official commented:
The flaw in planning [Phase One] was the
idea that poorer people can't pay more
for bigger plots, but by subletting most
families are making around K Shs 200 a
month per room so they can afford to pay
more.
In addition, bigger lots in a wider range of
sizes would better facilitate the sale of some
plots at market value. The profits from these
sales could then be used to cross-subsidize the
less costly options. Costs in Phase Two were
to be further lowered by eliminating the con-
tractor-built wet cores. Instead, allottees
would be provided with additional loan funds to
build their own wet-cores.
(2) Construction Loans
The DCDP recognized the used to provide project
beneficiaries with credit facilities. Loans
were administered by the DPD's Financial
Section. The loans were estimated to cover the
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costs of materials sufficient to construct two
rooms. The loans were released in installments
upon completion of each distinct phase of the
dwelling construction. At no point was the
total loan to exceed the security provided by
the allottee's deposit against the mortgage (K
Shs 400) plus the assessed value of materials in
that portion of the dwelling already con-
structed.
Contrary to expectations, most households hired
small contractors, artisans and laborers to
build major parts of their dwellings. This was
because either the allottees did not possess the
skills needed to build a house to the required
standard, or they did not have the time to
devote to construction. Thus, a shift from
materials loans to construction loans has
resulted.
(3) More Appropriate Community Facilities:
The plans for the DCDP called for the construc-
tion primary schools, medical dispensaries,
community centers, and markets and workshops.
Cnce again delays were experienced due to
debates over the appropriateness of lowered
standards. The NCC rejected the design for a
simple, functional, low-cost health center, and
called for a higher standard facility
Construction eventually commenced on a
redesigned facility, but the World Bank refused
to fund it because it did not conform to the
original project specifications. A low-cost
primary school specially designed for the DCDP
was reluctantly accepted by the NCC.
(4) Assisting Community Development:
The DPD's Community Development Section was
responsible for facilitating participation and
group organization. Its activities encompassed
the following:
- publicising the project to the low-income
population;
- processing application;
- providing orientation and training to
allottees prior to lot occupation;
- providing technical assistance during
construction;
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- helping to organize community groups for
various purposes;
- working with organizations such as UNEP,
UNICEF and the N.C.C.K. to design and
implement social programs to enhance the
overall quality of life in the DCDP - for
example, programs in nutrition, child-care and
small-scale enterprises for women's groups.
The amount of various types of assistance and
advice available to allottees in site-and-
services schemes has grown steadily over the
years, and project authorities deserve to be
commended for their efforts. Room for improve-
ment remains however, as post-occupancy studies
carried out in the DCDP show.
one study found that the most popular form of
dwelling construction in the DCDP was where the
allottee subcontracted out the various building
tasks to artisans and laborers3 7 . The allottee's
own role was to supervise the work, purchase
materials and manage the financial situation.3 8
It was found that allottees were not well-
equipped to handle this role. 3 9 Allottees
lacked the following:
- information on the type of materials to pur-
chase, where to purchase them, prices, and
arrangements for delivery of goods;
- the ability to draw up contractual agreements
with artisans and the awareness of how to
enforce these agreements;
- familiarity with the approvals procedures;
- the ability to keep financial records and
manage funds (illiteracy was a factor here);
- foresight in terms of being able to plan the
construction.
Soni (1980) suggests the inclusion of a
technical information center disseminating
information in simple and understandable
language.40 Legal advice on matters related to
contractual agreements could also be usefully
dispensed. The implication is that all of this
would lead to significant savings in time,
effort and money.
(5) Project Administration:
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In 1975, the NCC formally established the
Dandora Community Developnent Department (or
Dandora Project Department - DPD in short)
which was charged with the administrative
responsibility for the project's implementation.
To oversee the work of the DPD, a Project
Committee was formed. This committee, made up
of representatives from various ministries,
(Finance and Economic Planning; Local
Govern-ment; Housing and Social Services) the
NHC and the Nairobi Proincial Administration,
was chaired the NCC's Town Clerk. This high-
level committee it was hoped would be an effec-
tive policy-making and coordinating mechanism.
The DPD was made up of four sections: Mana-
gerial; Technical; Financial; and Community
Development. Personnel for these sections were
drawn from a variety of disciplines, including:
engineering; architecture and planning; quantity
surveying; law; accounting; and sociology.
Importantly, all the sections were grouped
together and housed in on-site offices. This
enabled the DPD to very closely monitor the
project's implementation, and communicaiton be-
tween the various project unit sections was con-
venient. Even more significant was the fact
that the DPD' s unimposing offices located on-
site were very much more accessible to the
allottees, than would have been the case if the
DPD had been housed in bewildering City Hall,
eleven kilometers away in the city-center.
Allottees were thus much more able to take
advantage of the asssistance offered by the DPD.
Some personal observations also suggest that the
DPD played a significant role as an indirect
advocate of the interests of the low-income
allottees.
A small, tightly-knit, well staffed project unit
with clear authority and responsibility, the DPD
appears to have been a successful example of
institutional decentralization. At the same
time, it is conceivable that this effective
semi-autonomous project unit attracted envy from
other quarters within the NCC. If indeed this
was so, then it is also conceivable that such
quarters also moved to frustrate the DPD's acti-
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vities when such opportunities presented them-
selves. Clearly the high-level project committee
was set up partly to intervene under precisely
these types of circumstances. However, evidence
that this committee used its potential clout is
hard to find.
In 1977, the DPD was merged with the newly
formed Housing Development Department in the NCC
to implement a city-wide low-cost shelter
program. The DPD had originally been created
within the framework of a longer-term
institution-building effort, and both the NCC
and the World Bank were anxious to repeat the
overall success with Phase Cne of the DCPD on a
wider basis. By merging the DPD with HDD, it
was hoped that the experience and expertise
accumulated at Dandora could be effectively
tapped and utilized to maximum advantage. The
departure of some of the senior technicians
directly involved in Phase One of the DCDP
obviously did not help in achieving this aim.
(6) Appropriate Standards:
By virtue of its scale, importance and overall
visibility within officialdom in Nairobi, the
DCDP had the effect of crystallizing and
surfacing the long-overdue need to revise
planning and building standards.
Confrontations between regulators and designers,
and costly delays in implementation dramatically
illustrated the seriousness of the problem, and
helped to precipitate a decision to attempt to
remedy the unfortunate situation. With funding
from the World Bank, Kenya became one of the
first Third World countries to commission a
low-cost housing by-law study in an effort to
update its existing regulations and streamline
the time-consuming and cumbersome administrative
procedures involved in obtaining official
approval for housing and community development.
The study which commenced in 1979 framed the
issue of appropriateness, of building
regulations as follows:
The most important aspect of relating
building regulations to the needs of the
population is how such regulations are
presented, how they are interpreted, and
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what degree of innovation, experimenta-
tion, and flexibility is to be permit-
ted.4 1
Performance specifications supported by
illustrative deemed to satisfy solutions were
emphasized in the legislation proposed by this
study which also called for frequent reviews of
regulations, followed by modifications where
necessary. The proposed regulations attempted
to address the problems of technical feasibility
for low-income residents, affordability, effi-
cient utilization of local resources and cons-
sistency with national developnent goals.
COMUNICABILITY
When change is first introduced in a specific
context, it has to be accompanied by a
concerted effort to publicise, describe and
explain it. Word-of-mouth, social and political
forums, the printed and electronic media, scale
models, demonstrations, shows and performances,
examples, both formal and informal channels,
must all be used in multiple fashion to reach
the target population. Effective communication
of the proposed change is crucial, for in the
final anaysis it is the perception of the pro-
posal held by the intended audience that will
ultimately affect the outcome. In this respect,
the communication process is aided if the source
of information is perceived as being legitimate
and credible. Involving the users in
formulating the change proposals may help to
achieve this aim. Time and cost permitting, a
successful demonstration may be convincing,
while also allowing the client or target popula-
tion to draw their own conclusions. When
selecting similar examples to point at,
contextural differences should be carefully con-
sidered.
Change produces a complex web of tangible and
untangible results, both intended and
unintended. Where results are intangible,
communication difficulties may arise.
Especially where the change is closely
interwined with a larger existing system, it is
important to isolate the benefits resulting from
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change in order to convince the audience of the
value of the proposal. To the extent that this
is important, change should be designed and
presented in a manner that makes the unfamiliar
less threatening, and the banal more intriguing;
it is important for the change to attract and
the attention of the target population.
Communication will be facilitated if the
cultural determinants of a specific context were
taken into account during the shaping of the
proposed change. Many imaginative proposals
have been ignored or dropped because of their
cultural insensitivity.
Due to the tremendous unmet demand for
residential accommodation in Nairobi, any
low-cost shelter program is almost certain to
elicit a wide response. However, in the case of
site-and-services schemes there appear to have
been some difficulties. In the DCDP it is
questionable whether the low-income applicants
fully appreciated the real meaning of self-help
and their own role in the construction and con-
solidation of their own dwellings. Furthermore,
potential applicants who were poor and illit-
erate were unable to understand the project
announcements in the printed media. Information
received second- and third- hand appears to have
been garbled with the result that serious
misunderstandings took place. Some applicants
were incredulous because they were under the
impression that the K Shs 20 fee for obtaining
the application forms was all that was required
for them to acquire a dwelling.4 2 Others were
discouraged by the NCC's track record in the
field of housing which strongly suggested that
the beneficiaries of public projects were
usually not the poor or the truly needy, but the
middle-class and wealthy. Instances like the
numerous false starts experienced with the
redevelopment program in Mathare Valley, the
widespread demolition of squatter settlements,
and the frequent official pronouncements
condeming structures constructed out of
discarded materials, did little to instill
confidence in the poor and needy about the NCC's
intentions to provide assistance to those who
needed it most.
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PLANNED CHAIEE: SCOPE AND PROSPECT
A plausible scenario of Nairobi in the year
2000 is submitted by Hake (1977) in the final
chapter of his book, African Metropolis:
Nairobi's Self-Help City:
What sort of society will Nairobi by by the
year 2000? A city of some four million
people will be surrounded by an extended and
increasingly blurred rural-urban belt. there
will be a growing number of families living
together in the urban area: most of these
will live in houses built by self-help, with
a minority in Council-owned or 'modern'
housing. While improvements in the standards
of social amenity will be noticeable in some
areas, nevertheless the failure adequately to
reduce the rate of pupulation growth will
ensure that migration to the city will out-
pace the provision of minimal infrastructure
unless radical steps are taken and policies
changed. A net population growth of 5% in
the city would mean an additional 200,000
people each year.
Probably some 1,200,000 will be earning
income to support themselves or a family in
Nairobi. If the modern economy continues
along present trends, the formal sector of
employment might be projected to provide at
the most 500,000 jobs.1
C0 the basis of his analysis of the so-called
self-help city, Hake argues that those who
exist in the informal sector display a tremen-
dous capacity to help themselves against all
odds, and suggests that this capacity must be
viewed positively and assisted with public
resources. With the objective of establishing
viable alternative approaches, Hake calls for
the planning and implementation of small but
imaginiative pilot projects creating groups fo
people with a new and wider vision.2
The British colonial rodel of government which
relied heavily on control is considered
inappropriate for the circumstances now pre-
vailing in Kenya. Wherever possible and prac-
tical, the stick must be discarded in favor of
the carrot; less emphasis should be placed on
preventive measures and more on incentive mecha-
nisms (for example, a system of decreasing
installments as a reward for those project ben-
eficiaries who make their payments regularly
and promptly). Administrative control must also
become more flexible (for example, the deemed
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to satisfy solutions for building construction
suggested in the previous chapter) and more
responsive to local conditions. And for all
this to work successfully, the target population
must be kept well-informed, involved and re-
educated when necessary. '1o prevent excessive or
abusive change, the political process must func-
tion as an effective form for demand-making, and
as a system of checks and balances. A healthy
political process is also vital for longer-term
social stability.
This thesis does not advocate change for merely
the sake of change. It does, however, call for
ideas whose time has come, and suggests that a
more critical or questioning attitude should be
adopted towards conventional wisdom and accepted
practice.
Change proposals are more likely to succeed if
they are demonstrably doable, and evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. Short strides may be
preferable to long leaps. Modest proposals
leading to gradual improvements would appear to
be more sustainable over time. While big, bold
ideas may fire the imaginiation, the greater
expenditure in terms of time, effort, money, and
the accompanying institutional adjustment may
preclude such occurences on a frequent basis.
In such cases, external assistance from change
agents such as the World Bank plays a useful
role. Change which augments will generally have
wider appeal than change which seeks to
restrict. Appeal is an important aspect to
consider, particularly if there is to be hope of
shifting a greater proportion of urbanization
over to the private sector (for example, there
is there is increasing discussion now about
encourag ing private housing markets to work more
effectively).
Change efforts must mount agressive media cam-
paigns to inform, educate and draw widespread
support. For example, in Lusaka, Zambia, pro-
ponents of slum upgrading conducted a successful
lobbying effort through the local printed media,
and were able to overcome initial opposition
from official quarters. Furthermore, once the
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government agreed to undertake slum upgrading
(with considerable support from the World Bank),
understanding, support and enthusiasm amongst
the intended beneficiaries was systematically
built up. Films, slide-shows and theatrical
performances were all used to communicate
project-related messages, invite participation,
and stimulate discussion.
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the
conceptual and practical utility of change-
oriented planning and implementation. Agendas
for postitive change in Third World cities must
include the following items:
- identification of the intended
beneficiaries and their capacity to absorb
assistance;
- careful targetting of appropriate public
resources;
- creation of linkages between public and sec-
tor resources to promote greater efficiency
and equity;
- setting of goals and objectives which not
only match needs, but the available ways and
means as well;
- establishment of priorities.
Such agendas for change must also recognize that
usually the urban poor ascribe to norms which
are short-term, individual and material rather
than longer-term, collective and idealistic.
Site-and-services schemes are presented here
not as a panacea for the problem of low-cost
shelter provision in urban areas. Such schemes
however, appear to possess many advantages and
under the prevailing circumstances in many Third
World cities, site-and services schemes show
considerable scope and promise for realizing
environmental as well as socio-economic change.
Apart from the several site-and-services schemes
which have been implemented, there are other
developnents in Nairobi which signal a move in
the direction of planned change. In Kawangware,
one of Nairobi's larger unplanned settlements
with an estimated population of 30,000 inhabi-
tants, an ambitious so-called Human Developnent
Project has been under way since 1975. Launched
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by the Institute of Cultural Affairs, a Chicago-
based non-profit organization under the auspi-
ces of the Catholic Church, the project involves
a variety of activities including: upgrading of
dwellings, neighborhood stores and the local
market; improving garbage collection; setting up
craft cooperatives; and urban farming. ICA
volunteers have started kindergartens, adult
education classes, and a small community
library. A public health program is also under
way. Similar programs are being implemented by
the National Christian Council of Kenya
(N.C.C.K) in other low-income areas around
Nairobi.
Nairobi' s transportation is steadily worsening.
Existing problems include the heavy financial
burden of importing fuel, high road accident
rates, lack of adequate pedestrian facilities,
inadequate public transport, traffic congestion
on major roads and serious bottlenecks at peak-
hours around access points to the central busi-
ness district and the industrial area. A
comprehensive strategy for making better use of
existing transportation facilities has been for-
mulated. The proposed strategy ; includes the
following:
- a system of exclusive rights-of-way for buses
and minibuses along heavily travelled routes;
- control of vehicular flows through widespread
use of electronic traffic signals;
- developnent of more footpaths, walkways,
pedestrian malls and footbridges;
- increased car parking fees in the downtown
area;
- staggering of working hours between the com-
mercial and industrial areas, different
starting times for public schools, and longer
opening hours for stores;
- stricter driving tests and vehicular inspec-
tion, a safe driving campaign, and the
establishment of a special police accident
investigation unit.
According to a 1979 survey3 , privately owned and
operated minibuses (locally referred to as
matutus) carried an estimated 66,500 passengers
daily. Despite their usefulness, there is a
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drastic need to regulate these vehicles for
numerous reasons to do with road and passenger
safety. In order not to discourage matatu
operators, a program of tighter enforcement of
regulations is being coupled with an assistance
program which makes low-cost vehicle repair,
insurance and credit facilities available to
such operators. This is a good example of the
mixing of control and incentive discussed
earlier in this chapter.
Both the tale of transportation in Nairobi and
the Kawangware story are illustrations of
attempts to realize planned change, and like
site-and-services schemes, embody many of the
ideas pursued in this thesis. Perhaps the most
important aspect of all these examples is a fun-
datmental shift in perception from looking at
the situdation as a problem to viewing it as an
opportunity for creative intervention. This
difference in perception or attitudes, tends to
generate different approaches. Schon (1980)
sums it up as follows:
Problem setting matters. The ways in which
we set urban problems determine both the
kinds of purposes and values which we seek to
realize, and the directions in which we seek
solutions. Contrary to the problem-solving
perspective, problems are not given....
What this thesis has suggested is a pragamatic
direction for seeking solutions which systemati-
cally takes into account the key aspects of the
realities and specificities of a particular
situation. 2b quote Schon (1980) again:
We must immerse ourselves in the concrete
particularity of the situations in order to
gain access to many different combinations of
features and relations that open up new
possibilities ....5
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how
clear thinking about planned change may enable
immersion and open up new possibilities for
environmental intervention in Third World
cities.
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